POLICING BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE YEAR 2001

Report of the Regionalization Study Team

Ministry of Solicitor General

August 1990

POLICING BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE YEAR 2001

Report of the Regionalization Study Team
Police Services Branch
Ministry of Solicitor General
August 1990

91-00469/

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:
Policing British Columbia in the year 2001

Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-7726-1198-X

1. Police administration - British Columbia.
I. British Columbia. Police Services Branch.
Regionalization Study Team. II. Title: Report of
the Regionalization Study Team, Police Services
Branch, Ministry of Solicitor General.

HV8159.B7P74 1990 363.2'09711'0905 C90-092238-9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER ONE:
The Pros and Cons of Regionalization 3
CHAPTER TWO:
Regionalization in British Columbia 9
CHAPTER THREE:
Alternative Organization of Police Services 13
CHAPTER FOUR:
What About Costs? 17
CHAPTER FIVE:
Some Options for Consideration 24
APPENDIX A
The Ostrom Thesis: Not Applicable in Canada 33
APPENDIX B
Transfer of Duties from The British Columbia Provincial Police to the R.C.M.P. . . . 42
APPENDIX C
Communications and Police Management Information Systems 47
APPENDIX D
9-1-1 Emergency System 52
APPENDIX E
CRD Police Services: A Proposed Model 54
APPENDIX F
Police-Fire Consolidation in Kalamazoo, Michigan 87
APPENDIX G
Report of the Police Officers Working Group on Regionalization of Police Departments 90
ENDNOTES 106
BIBLIOGRAPHY 108

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Ministry wishes to thank the Mayors, the members of Police Boards, the members of municipal councils, the municipal, provincial and federal police officials and the many other persons--too numerous to name here--who provided information and expert advice during the course of the regionalization study. We also are grateful for the assistance provided by staff members of the Legislative Library, the McPherson Library of the University of Victoria and the library of the Justice Institute of British Columbia.

POLICING BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE YEAR 2001

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This examination of regionalization issues was initiated in November 1989 by the Police Services Branch of the Ministry of Solicitor General of British Columbia. The objective was to identify ways that policing might be made more effective and efficient, given the steady growth of urban populations, the increasing sophistication of criminal enterprises and the rising costs of public safety.

The inquiry was conducted by two groups under the direction of the Assistant Deputy Minister, Police Services Branch. The Regionalization Study Team was made up of one federal public servant seconded to the project from the federal Ministry of the Solicitor General and one consultant who is a former police officer. The study team reported directly to the ADM, Police Services Branch (PSB). The Police Officers' Working Group on Regionalization was made up of officers from forces in the Capital Regional District (CRD) and the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD), including a representative of the B.C. Federation of Police Officers. The committee was coordinated by a consultant reporting to the ADM, PSB. The recommendations of the police officers' committee are attached as Appendix G of this document.

The work of the study team was completed in three phases. First, selected literature on regionalization was reviewed, with special reference to the Canadian experience. The study team then visited the mayor, police board and police chief or RCMP detachment commander of each jurisdiction in the CRD and GVRD. The opinions of present and former municipal, provincial and federal officials and other knowledgeable persons also were solicited. Then a broad range of possible options was developed for consideration by municipal and provincial officials and other experts.

The literature revealed that where extensive regionalization had been introduced, in the United Kingdom, Ontario and Quebec, and the United States, the arguments for and against the process had been essentially identical. Those in favour believed that larger, "full service" police departments provided better service to the public than several smaller forces, and more interesting work and better career opportunities for the officers, at costs equal to or lower than the cost of several small departments.

Those opposed did not believe that money could be saved. They also argued that the quality of service would decline because officers would be drawn away from the smaller cities to work in the downtown areas of the larger cities. Opponents of regionalization also asserted that the police and citizens of small communities to some degree lost their identity when their local police were incorporated into larger, more impersonal agencies.

Recent Canadian data for Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba support the argument that larger forces can be more operationally effective and cost efficient than a number of smaller agencies. No studies dealing with post-regionalization loss of local identity were found and that issue could not be addressed. There was some indication, however, that resentment over a change in policing agencies was a short-term phenomenon, as happened in the take-over, in 1950, of the British Columbia Provincial Police by the RCMP. Today, the RCMP is accepted.

Discussions with municipal officials, police executives and other experts revealed an interesting divergence of opinion. Most mayors and police board members opposed regionalization,

basing their opposition on the general arguments noted above. Their primary concern was to maintain current levels of service and to prevent personnel from being drawn from suburban communities into downtown core areas. The potential rise in costs also was important. Maintenance of local identity appeared to be a lower priority.

Police executives and other experts presented a broad consensus in favour of regionalization. The consensus was based on the belief that police forces could be more effective and more cost-efficient if resources were consolidated and reorganized. Most believed that the limits of cooperation already had been reached and that change was essential. All were concerned about the perception that regionalization would result in the withdrawal of resources from smaller communities. Most chiefs suggested specific measures to ensure that existing levels of service were maintained.

Although there was general agreement among police officials that regionalization should be implemented, many views were expressed about the form of regionalization. In all, about a dozen models were proposed, ranging from the status quo to a single police force for the province. There also was support for consolidating police and fire departments and for province-wide unification of all public safety and emergency services.

No comprehensive long-range plan for the development of police services for the province has been established. Provincial measures seem to have been introduced in a reactive fashion to meet immediate objectives, not as part of a long term plan.

The options for consideration set out in Chapter Five of the report are based on the opinions expressed during the course of the study by municipal, provincial and federal officials, municipal police chiefs and senior officers, federal police officials, representatives of police professional and fraternal associations, and other knowledgeable persons. The options also are supported by statistical data and additional information from the regional police forces of Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba, and by insights gained from scholarly literature and government documents that deal with regionalization of public safety agencies.

The options are not ranked according to suggested priority, and may be approached in any order. They address five general areas: directions that provincial leadership in public safety might take; ways in which police technology and services might be improved; incentives that could be offered to jurisdictions where regionalization might profitably be implemented; the potential value of consolidation of police, fire, ambulance and other emergency services; and the financial benefit of engaging the RCMP under contract to police municipalities and unincorporated areas.

The report includes several appendices. Appendix A deals with arguments against regionalization made by a group of American academics in the 1970's. The study team concluded that, based on recent Canadian data, the assertions made by the group are not valid for Canada and, in particular, not valid for British Columbia in 1990. Appendix B provides some detail on the replacement of the British Columbia Provincial Police by the RCMP. Appendices C and D, respectively, describe the shortcomings of existing police communications systems and the 9-1-1 emergency service.

Appendix E is an assessment of the personnel and financial resources that would be necessary if the police departments of Victoria, Saanich, Oak Bay and Central Saanich were to be consolidated. An organization chart is included. The plan was developed in 1985 by the chiefs of the four cities and the chief of Esquimalt. Although regionalization was deemed to be too expensive at the time, it is noteworthy that the number of sworn personnel and the combined police

budgets of 1990 are well above the proposed levels of the 1985 plan, even when corrected for inflation.

Appendix F is a brief description of the benefits gained by the citizens of Kalamazoo, Michigan, after consolidation of their police and fire agencies. Consolidated public safety agencies are common in Quebec and across the USA. In British Columbia, only Esquimalt has consolidated the two services. The savings in Esquimalt appear to be comparable to those reported by agencies in Quebec, Kalamazoo and Sunnyvale, California.

Appendix G, as noted earlier, is the final report of the Police Officers' Working Group on Regionalization. The line officers' recommendations are directed mainly to job-oriented issues that would have to be addressed if regionalization were implemented.

INTRODUCTION

The Police Services Branch of the Ministry of Solicitor General undertook a review of policing in British Columbia as a first step toward entering the next century with the most effective and efficient law enforcement system possible. Regionalization is a comprehensive method of addressing service delivery, and that is the focus of this study paper.

There is an urgency to the task.

In 1989, the provincial population increased by 60,000 people. Projections are that it will continue to grow by an average of 52,000 people each year from now until 2011. By then, the population will exceed four million--1.19 million more people than live in British Columbia today. At the same time, more British Columbians will be living in urban centres.

In the past, as crime rates increased, the usual response was to recruit more police officers. In recent years, however, restraints on public spending have caused police executives to look for alternatives to recruiting more officers. New approaches being developed are proactive and community-based, a trend that demands more coordinated efforts by police, and other public safety and social service agencies.

Twelve "independent" municipalities maintain their own police forces. Each is accountable to a local police board, chaired by the mayor. Other members are appointed by the municipal council and the Lieutenant Governor. Local tax payers fund their municipal forces. The provincial government provides a subsidy in the form of an Independent Police Equalization Grant.

Fifty-one incorporated municipalities receive police services under contract with the RCMP. There is no formal local accountability for these detachments. Instead, they see themselves as accountable to the federal Solicitor General through the Commanding Officer of 'E' Division and the Commissioner of the force. They have a relationship with the Ministry of Solicitor General for operational and administrative matters, and with the Ministry of Attorney General for issues of administration of justice. Under the existing contracts, the federal government pays ten percent of the policing costs for communities with populations of more than 15,000 and thirty percent of the costs for communities with populations between 5,000 and 15,000.

In its role as the provincial police force, the RCMP has policed the rest of British Columbia since 1950. While this role extends to all communities with populations of less than 5,000, there is no formal local accountability. The provincial police detachments are accountable to the provincial government and to the federal government, but the reporting arrangements are ill-defined. Currently, the federal government pays thirty percent and the province pays seventy percent of the cost of the provincial police force.

Historically, the ability to arrest offenders and suppress crime was the measure of police effectiveness. Today, measures of quality, quantity, cost and control of service are regarded as more suitable by police administrators. In future, there will be more emphasis on problem solving and on the ability of police to meet new operational demands.

In addressing these concerns and British Columbia's policing needs, this report assesses the pros and cons of regionalization as one method for improving the ability of police to deliver high quality, co-ordinated and effective police services. British Columbians are already involved in the new, coordinated approaches to policing. They are shouldering a greater responsibility for helping the police through programs such as community based policing, store front police stations and crime prevention.

Although this report is not a full map of the way ahead for British Columbia, it does provide a starting point for a pragmatic search for a comprehensive system of effective and efficient policing for British Columbia which is sensitive to the particular needs of individual British Columbian communities and the Province as a whole.

CHAPTER ONE

THE PROS AND CONS OF REGIONALIZATION

Suppressing and preventing crime and arresting and punishing criminals have long been recognized as primary duties of government. Courts and dungeons are ancient institutions. Civilian police, however--as distinct from military troops and night watches--are a relatively recent development in western democracies. In the United Kingdom, the Unites States, Canada and most Commonwealth nations, the model law enforcement agency has been the London Metropolitan Police, established in 1829, by Sir Robert Peel. As other cities and towns established their own municipal police departments, a tradition of local control over policing was established. This tradition went unchallenged in the United Kingdom and North America until after the Second World War.

During the post-war era, the United Kingdom and North America experienced a long cycle of growth in national wealth, population and criminal activity. It appeared that no matter how rich a society became or how broadly its wealth was distributed among the people, crime rates grew rapidly. More police were recruited and more equipment was deployed to meet the threat but crime rates continued to rise. Politicians, public servants and police officials reached a consensus: something more effective than the traditional response of more men and equipment had to be developed to deal with criminals in a modern, mobile, highly technological society. Legal, scientific, political and organizational remedies were introduced to help police suppress crime.

Among the new measures was regionalization of police jurisdictions. Regionalization--sometimes referred to as consolidation or amalgamation--meant joining two or more police jurisdictions to create an integrated metropolitan force to police an area previously served by separate agencies.

REGIONALIZATION IN THE U.K., UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Regionalization was implemented extensively in England during the 1960's, on the recommendation of a Royal Commission on Police. There was considerable support for a single national police agency but the strong central supervisory role of the Home Office, which provides 50 percent of funding for local police departments, was considered adequate to ensure that effective policing would be maintained across the country. The existing 158 municipal forces were reorganized into forty-three regional departments. It is notable that the debate in the U.K. focused almost entirely on protecting the public, not on reducing police costs.

In the United States, the movement toward regionalization received a significant impetus from **The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society**, a report published in 1967, by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Numerous other national advisory commissions and state, county and municipal committees commissioned studies to evaluate the benefits of consolidated, integrated and contracted police services. The effects were remarkable. In 1967, the estimated number of American police agencies stood at 40,000; by 1989 the estimated number had fallen to 25,000, which included campus police and similar forces. Fewer than 12,400 agencies were of the "regular" type that returned UCR data to the FBI.(1)

Canada, historically, has been a leader in regionalizing police services. Since 1905, the RCMP has provided police protection under contract. The provincial and municipal RCMP detachments, with divisional headquarters providing central services, have operated as regional police agencies. The RCMP nationally is, de facto, a nation-wide regional police force. The Ontario Provincial Police and the Quebec Police Force are regional forces within their respective jurisdictions.

The first Canadian example of municipal regionalization was created in Ontario in 1957, when thirteen municipal departments were combined to form the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force. Later, other regional forces were organized in Ontario, reducing the number of police jurisdictions in that province from 280 in 1964 to 128 in 1975.(2)

Similar consolidation was implemented in Manitoba, where fourteen forces were united to form the Winnipeg Police, and in Quebec, where twenty-six forces were unified to create the Montreal Urban Community Police. A Quebec law of 1965 and the **Police Act** of 1968 encouraged municipalities to consolidate police services. Over the course of a decade, the number of police jurisdictions in Quebec was reduced from 315 to 209.(3)

The Choquette Committee, reporting in 1971 on policing in Quebec, echoed the earlier U.K. Royal Commission in asserting that "when deciding if regionalization is necessary for the efficiency of the Force, it is up to those opposing it to show that a police force would be more effective without integration."(4)

In 1982, the Nova Scotia Police Commission, examining the possible regionalization of seven police forces serving Cape Breton County, visited Ontario to evaluate the success of the regional forces created there between 1971 and 1974. The Commission found that police costs per capita were 20 percent lower for the regionalized forces than for the municipal forces. Although the costs per capita and per thousand dollars of assessed valuation were higher in Cape Breton than in Ontario, there were more police per thousand citizens in the regionalized Ontario forces than in Cape Breton.

The Nova Scotia Royal Commission also noted that regional forces were better able to employ civilian personnel in a range of activities, at considerably less cost than for sworn personnel. The Commission, therefore, strongly recommended regionalization for Cape Breton. In 1988, the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution (Marshall Commission) initiated an external review of police services. The ensuing report, **Public Policing in Nova Scotia**, favoured some form of regionalization of police forces, including RCMP detachments.(5)

Also in 1988, Professor Alan Grant, in a report titled **Policing Arrangements in New Brunswick with Particular Reference to the Highway Patrol Function**, strongly recommended integration of small New Brunswick police jurisdictions. Professor Grant further recommended integration of the highway patrol function within a regionalized provincial force.(6)

The arguments for and against regionalization may, in addition to genuine concern, indicate underlying individual attitudes with respect to change. There is a fundamental difference between them, however: the general propositions in favour can be supported by Canadian data over a thirty year period; the contrary arguments depend on U.S. survey data collected in the early 1970's by a single small group of American academics and on anecdotal Canadian evidence.

The notion that a small local force is as good or better than a full service regional department contradicts almost every precept of effective organization. It argues for a multiplicity of very small police agencies serving a given metropolitan area, always dependent upon a large force somewhere in the region to provide necessary special services. That indeed was the position

taken by Dr. Elinor Ostrom of the University of Indiana who, with a few academic colleagues, opposed consolidation of American police forces. During the mid-1970's, when the move toward regionalization in the U.S. was gaining momentum, Dr. Ostrom and her associates published a number of articles in praise of the estimated 30,000 American police forces that employed ten officers or less.(7) (Ostrom's basic assertions are discussed in Appendix A).

It has been argued that large departments are not close to the communities they serve. This is not true. The RCMP, with more than 16,000 officers, is highly regarded by the residents it serves in communities from coast to coast, yet it is probably the most frugal with respect to human resources "on the street" of any force in Canada. Furthermore, large forces have initiated team and zone policing, store-front police stations, community-based policing, community crime prevention, Block Watch and other programs to bring the police and the public closer together. Small forces are much less able to provide these services and programs.

The perception that larger forces are less responsive to the concerns of individual residents is very important, nonetheless. The central issue seems to be the level of patrol activity and response to calls for service. Ways by which this problem could be resolved without foregoing the benefits of consolidated special services are noted in the following two paragraphs.

Regional police boards represent the public in regionalized jurisdictions outside B.C. There is no evidence that they are less responsive or effective than municipal boards. Regional boards also counter the concern that municipal politicians sometimes exert undue influence over municipal police operations. Moreover, there is evidence (from Winnipeg, for example) that council members from areas that once were independent municipalities keep a careful watch over police operations in their districts, to ensure that acceptable levels of service are maintained.(8)

As for residents and police officers of small communities losing their identities, this is not an inevitable consequence of regionalization. There are measures that could be implemented to resolve this perceived problem. For example, the municipalities could preserve a sense of local identity if the insignia worn by officers and displayed on police automobiles were retained after consolidation, and if the former local police stations were maintained as precinct headquarters.

THE ARGUMENTS

Opinions for and against regionalization were identical in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. They fell within three general categories: effectiveness, equity and expense.

ARGUMENTS BASED ON EFFECTIVENESS

The favourable view

Advocates of regionalization argue that a single large full service police force can provide better protection and community services because a large force allows flexibility to deploy personnel that is not available to small departments. For example:

1. A large force with area-wide jurisdiction, communications, criminal identification and crime analysis can range across its territory as criminals do, without regard for borders. It can be more effective in preventing crime and arresting criminals than can several small forces mainly involved in policing their own municipalities.

2. A large force can create special squads such as narcotics, juveniles, and robbery-homicide that attack area-wide crime problems and develop unique expertise and criminal intelligence that usually cannot be matched by small organizations.
3. A large force can obtain sophisticated equipment that small departments cannot afford.
4. A large force can muster enough personnel from its own ranks to deal with extraordinary events without calling for aid from other agencies, unlike small departments dependent on neighbouring agencies that are not always able to respond.
5. A large force can develop long-range and contingency planning and research capabilities to make the force more effective.
6. A large force can afford ongoing inhouse training for all ranks to make the organization more effective.
7. A large force can provide more uniform law enforcement across an area.
8. A large force can be more effective and still be closer to the community because it can provide dedicated resources for community crime prevention programs, victim and witness services, store-front police stations, beat patrols, generalist patrol officers and other programs that put police officers in direct contact with the public.
9. A large force may be less vulnerable to local political influence.
10. A large force can provide more attractive career possibilities for employees and should attract the best recruits. A large pool of candidates for promotion should ensure that the best officers are promoted to command positions. These factors should enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization.

The unfavourable view

Opponents of regionalization usually present four arguments:

1. It is not correct to say that one large police force in a region can provide better protection and better services than can several small forces.
2. A large police force cannot be as close to the public as can a small department.
3. Local control over police policy is lost with regionalization.
4. Residents of small communities find it harder to identify with regional agencies, and are said by some to lose their identity, when well-known officers are transferred elsewhere and the name of the department is changed to reflect regional responsibilities.

ARGUMENTS BASED ON EQUITY

Equity means all citizens in a democratic state are entitled to equal protection of the law. It also means that everyone should pay a fair share for the administration of justice.

The argument against equity is that any municipality that is willing and able should not be prevented from paying higher taxes to provide higher levels of police service.

Providing high-quality police services across a region could provide both equality of protection and cost.

ARGUMENTS BASED ON EXPENSE

The favourable view

Advocates of regionalization maintain that the cost of consolidated services would not be greater and, in the long-term, probably would be less than the cost of several small departments. This position is based on sound assumptions:

1. Significant economies of scale could be achieved through central purchasing of goods and services.
2. Personnel, sworn and civilian, could become available to provide common central services because economies could be achieved through rationalization of functions such as communications, criminal records, crime analysis, identification services, administration, personnel selection and training.
3. There could be reductions in the number of officers in the more senior ranks.
4. There could be reduced overtime costs due to more flexible staff deployment, based on larger numbers of personnel.
5. Fewer buildings and capital expenditures might be needed.

The unfavourable view

Opponents of regionalization assert that consolidated police services could cost as much or more than the existing small departments. This argument also is based on reasonable assumptions:

1. Significant start-up costs are associated with amalgamation of several agencies, including uniforms, patrol cars, communications and information systems.
2. Salaries and benefits probably would rise to the levels of the highest paid forces in the area.
3. Full service across a region could require more, not fewer, personnel.
4. "Buyout" payments may be necessary for officers retired prematurely because of reorganization.

DISCUSSION

With respect to arguments based on expense, both sides are correct to some extent. There are significant costs and organizational problems associated with regionalization but the long-term financial benefits far exceed the short-term start-up expenditures. Equalization of salaries and benefits would only raise the cost markedly if significant differences in remuneration existed

among the agencies to be consolidated. The 1989 data from Ontario indicate that, on average, regionalized police forces in that province are equally or more effective at similar or lower cost than independent municipal forces (see Table I, next page). Canadian data, therefore, indicate that regionalized departments are more effective, more cost-efficient and provide more equitable service than small departments.(9, see also Table I, following page).

With respect to regionalization requiring more rather than less personnel, Canadian evidence from Ontario, Manitoba and Quebec does not support the claim. American research indicates that during planning for consolidation, decisions sometimes are made to develop services that were not previously supplied by any agency within the area to be regionalized. If the forces involved were very small, probably no services beyond patrol could be provided without additional personnel. This enhanced capability might increase the number of personnel and, consequently, the overall cost of the regionalized force.(10)

TABLE I

SELECTED STATISTICS

COMPARING REGIONAL AND OTHER POLICING IN ONTARIO, 1988

REGIONAL FORCES	POPULATION (1,000'S)	COST PER OFFICER	NUMBER POLICE	RATIOS: ONE TO	POLICE PER 1000
PEEL	650.0	73,094	921	705	1.42
HAMILTON/ WENTWORTH	429.5	71,287	668	643	1.56
YORK	431.0	55,909	599	719	1.39
WATERLOO	342.0	71,365	463	738	1.38
DURHAM	363.3	67,690	456	796	1.26
HALTON	292.4	73,686	319	916	1.15
SUDBURY	151.3	68,079	226	669	1.49
HALDEMAND/ NORFORK	34.9	77,453	75	466	2.15
METRO TORONTO	2,133.0	77,256	5,373	397	2.5
MUNICIPAL FORCES					
OTTAWA	323.0	87,207	599	539	1.86
THUNDER BAY	112.5	67,629	199	565	1.78
SAULT STE MARIE	84.6	68,008	125	676	1.45
KINGSTON	61.0	73,362	102	598	1.70
RURAL MUNICIPAL FORCES					
KIRKLAND LAKE	11.3	70,454	22	514	1.95
NEW LISKEARD	5.2	84,428	7	748	1.35
RED ROCK	1.4	55,500	4	348	2.86

Source: Ontario Police Forces Budget and Resource Summary 1988/89

CHAPTER TWO

REGIONALIZATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

The RCMP provincial detachments, municipal forces and 'E' Division together constitute a quasi-regional police system that polices most of the province. The exceptions are the twelve municipalities that have independent forces. The twelve municipalities, except for Nelson, are closely grouped in the Greater Vancouver Regional District and the Capital Regional District, the two major population centres. Through close cooperation, the chiefs of the independent and the RCMP jurisdictions in the GVRD and the CRD have achieved the first stage of informal integration of services.

The provincial and municipal governments of British Columbia have several reasons for assessing whether a need exists to reorganize policing in the province. These include:

1. A possible increase in small police jurisdictions as continuing immigration and in-migration--estimated at more than one million additional residents by the year 2011--raise communities to the 5000 population level at which they must provide police service (11)
2. A possible increase in the number of RCMP contracts
3. The possibility that the federally proposed terms of a new RCMP contract may not be seen as equitable
4. Annual decreases in the federal share of RCMP municipal contract costs, leading toward increased policing costs for the contract municipalities without appropriate accountability by the RCMP
5. Federal policies governing the hiring and deployment of RCMP recruits which are seen to fail to properly consider provincial concerns
6. The opportunity for appropriate control over B.C. provincial police policies
7. The introduction of Independent Police Equalization Grants (IPEG) in 1989, to the twelve independent municipalities
8. The perceived inequities among municipalities, townships and rural areas with respect to the funding of police services

THE PROS AND CONS OF REGIONALIZATION IN B.C.

The literature

A number of studies of different aspects of regionalization in British Columbia have been undertaken during the past decade by the provincial Police Commission, by Police Services Branch, by the CRD chiefs, by the RCMP and by the GVRD.

In 1978, the Police Commission published the report of the **Task Force on Municipal Police Costs in B.C.** The Task Force reviewed the regionalization literature and the Canadian experience in Ontario and Manitoba. The authors noted certain personnel problems that had arisen in other jurisdictions but favoured regionalization in the CRD and the GVRD. The study, some-

times cited as the Lister Report, examined the question of relative costs and again resolved the issue generally in favour of regionalization.

In 1980, the Police Commission published **Regionalization of the Capital Regional District**, which set out a method for consolidation of services in that area. This document supported the opinion of the Task Force on Municipal Police Costs that the CRD offered the best opportunity for regionalization.

In 1983, the Police Services Branch produced **Regionalization of Police Services in Jurisdictions Policed by the RCMP**. This report stated the arguments in favour of regionalization and set out a number of different methods of achieving that objective. The major finding, however, was that formal regionalization of RCMP jurisdictions would not necessarily improve service or save money because the contract areas, for all practical purposes, were already regionalized.

In 1985, 'E' Division of the RCMP produced several studies on regionalization, focused on the North Okanagan area. The **Summary Reports** of that inquiry recognized the benefits of regionalization but found that informal regionalization was already in effect in the North Okanagan jurisdictions.

In 1985, the CRD Area Chiefs examined the practical issues associated with the amalgamation of police services in their cities. They noted that the Emergency Response Team (ERT), the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU), Crime Stoppers, Canine Services, Chaplaincy, Victim Services and Computerized Records Indexing already were essentially integrated. Identification services were under consideration and communications were viewed as a likely service for future consolidation.

The Area Chiefs developed a plan and an organization chart for a regionalized force to police Victoria, Saanich, Oak Bay and Central Saanich. The model developed by the chiefs involved some initial costs but would have resolved the problems of fragmented jurisdiction and could have saved money in the long term. The plan was deemed too costly and did not receive support. It should be noted, however, that by 1990, the sworn strength of the four departments and the sum of their annual budgets ($24.3 million) exceeded the levels deemed too high for a regionalized force in 1985 ($16.102 million combined 1984 budget corrected for inflation = $20.1 million in 1990).

In 1988, officials of the GVRD commissioned a study of regionalization in their area. The consultants identified the benefits of consolidation and recommended the development of a comprehensive contingency plan for providing regionalized police service in the event that the RCMP should withdraw from municipal policing in the Lower Mainland. The authors also proposed that local views concerning the patrol function and response to calls for service be recognized and respected. Further study of cost factors was recommended.(11)

In 1989, the Police Services Branch initiated the current study of police regionalization in B.C. The first objective of the study team was to solicit the views of police chiefs, mayors, police board members and officials of police professional and fraternal associations.

THE VIEWS OF MAYORS, POLICE BOARDS AND POLICE EXECUTIVES

The favourable view

Police executives across the province and provincial officials responsible for policing generally favour integration of services in some form. Most use the word "inevitable" to emphasize their opinions. Most believe that they have gone as far as they can with the formal and informal cooperation which has allowed them, so far, to get the job done.

There is consensus that, at the very least, centralization of common services should occur, regardless of whether full regionalization of any area is implemented. There is complete agreement that nothing will happen to improve police effectiveness through consolidation of functions unless the Ministry provides strong leadership.

Although there is general agreement among police officials that regionalization would be an improvement over the status quo, several different models were proposed. Within the GVRD there is some concern that the Vancouver police force might dominate the regional force, which, some thought, could lead to reductions in levels of patrol service in the smaller communities and limit the promotional opportunities of officers in the smaller departments. Within the CRD, there are similar concerns with respect to Victoria.

Greater Vancouver Regional District

A wide range of regionalization models was proposed by police and other officials. One would have a single regional police force for the GVRD. An alternative would have Vancouver as a single regional police force and the rest of the GVRD as another. Later the two forces could be combined if it were judged to be productive. This plan was put forward as a method of achieving a desirable long-range objective--a full service regional police force--by allaying the concerns of municipal politicians, police boards and police officers who view Vancouver as a potential juggernaut.

Another suggestion, also based to some degree on concern about "Big Vancouver," was for a Tri-Cities regional force uniting Port Moody, Port Coquitlam and Coquitlam.

A third proposal envisioned South Fraser and North Fraser regional forces that would have jurisdiction at least as far as Matsqui.

A fourth plan would combine Vancouver, West Vancouver and the two North Vancouver jurisdictions into one force, and the rest of the GVRD into another. This would ensure that personnel of one agency would not have to cross another region to reach a distant part of their own territory.

A fifth idea, a modification of the fourth, included a Fraser Valley region consisting of the Tri-Cities and all of the territory on both sides of the river as far east as Matsqui.

A sixth would unite Vancouver, Burnaby and New Westminster.

Capital Regional District

In the CRD, regionalization generally was taken to mean consolidation of the Victoria, Saanich, Oak Bay, Esquimalt and Central Saanich departments. Alternatives for Vancouver Island included a Saanich Peninsula regional force combining Central Saanich, North Saanich and Sidney; a single regional force for the CRD, perhaps excluding the Gulf Islands; and a tri-partite arrangement including a Saanich Peninsula region, a core cities region and a Western Communities region.

There also were proposals for regionalized highway patrols in the GVRD and the CRD.

Aside from the GVRD and CRD, the Okanagan Valley and the Nelson area seemed best suited to regional police operations.

The unfavourable view

The Study Team visited all municipal mayors and police boards in the CRD and the GVRD. Responses ranged from enthusiastic support for regionalization to a willingness to be persuaded by facts, and to enthusiastic support for the status quo, whether RCMP or independent municipal.

The unfavourable views were very similar to the arguments raised in the regionalization literature and discussed in Chapter One. Included among the unfavourable views were the opinions that:

1. A regional force would cost more than the existing force.
2. The level of service would decline under a regional force.
3. A regional force would not be community-oriented.
4. The community would lose part of its identity.
5. The status quo is satisfactory and there is no need for change.
6. The existing RCMP police detachment would be retained under contract, even if it cost more than an independent municipal force.

These responses to suggestions for change also were evident in 1950, when the B.C. Provincial Police was replaced by the RCMP.(12; see also Appendix B).

CHAPTER THREE

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS

The police chiefs, municipal officials and other experts proposed a broad range of alternative models to meet the challenges of policing British Columbia in the coming decades.

INFORMAL COOPERATION: THE STATUS QUO

The status quo in 1990, aside from the patrol function, is barely adequate in the opinions of most chiefs and appears to leave little room for improvement. The high level of cooperation among departments in the CRD and the GVRD masks the fact that current effectiveness rests heavily on personalities rather than on formal planning and organization. It is possible that a different group of chiefs might be less productive.

FORMAL COOPERATION

The first step beyond the status quo but short of regionalization would seem to be formal cooperation through signed agreements. Resources could be provided to underwrite joint operations or to share the costs of necessary centralized services provided by other agencies.

Some municipal officials suggested that if the provincial government were to specify mandatory provision of certain services (such as police boats, police helicopters, and victim service units), the various police boards and forces could provide those services by contracting with other agencies, joining forces, sharing resources or other means.

There are examples of formal agreements to share the costs of a service and to purchase a service, when needed, from another department. There are examples, such as the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU), of providing resources to achieve a general objective. There are examples of centralized purchase of standard items yielding significant savings.

There also are problems associated with cooperative agreements. Consolidated services (such as a highway patrol or a major crimes squad) that require the allocation of personnel not already assigned to similar duties could put inordinate strain on small forces that do not have sufficient staff to participate. In the past, this has led to assigned personnel being withdrawn from joint operations without notice, to attend to local exigencies. Command and support services for formal, combined operations also are problematic. A third problem, the need for separate overview committees for each formal joint service, could become unmanageable if too many committees were formed.

INTEGRATION OF CENTRAL SERVICES

Integration of central services as described here excludes motor patrol and response to calls for service other than major crimes and emergencies. Each municipal council and police board in an area could establish an acceptable level of patrol service for their jurisdiction. That level would be permanently maintained by the local patrol force.

Each municipality could contribute dedicated funds or personnel to a permanent regional force that would provide central services for the region. If personnel were seconded to a regional force, the secondment could be for a significant but specified period, to allow as many staff members as possible to gain wider experience, but an individual would not be recalled for local duty with the "home" department during the secondment.

The regional force could be an entirely separate permanent agency, or one to which some local officers might on occasion be seconded. It could have permanent management and civilian administrative support echelons with operational units staffed by seconded police officers, or it could combine elements of these and other models. An equitable funding formula, fair to all participating municipalities, could be established.

Among the necessary services identified by chiefs in the GVRD and the CRD that should be centralized are:

- radio communication and dispatch (see Appendix C)
- emergency service on 9-1-1 (see Appendix D)
- criminal identification
- police boats
- police helicopters
- police divers
- police dogs
- psychological counselling
- recruiting (through the Justice Institute)
- highway patrol
- major crimes squads
- emergency response teams
- court liaison
- purchasing of cars, uniforms, and guns.
- morality squads
- drug squads
- administrative and support systems
- criminal records
- internal investigation

FULL REGIONALIZATION

In a fully regionalized service, all aspects of policing are assumed by a single full-service agency. This is the standard model described in the professional literature and the concept that usually is under discussion when regionalization is praised or criticized. Good Canadian examples would include the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, the Surete de Quebec, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Winnipeg Police Force, and the RCMP in British Columbia, viewed as a single force.

PROVINCIALIZATION

Provincialization, in this context, means the amalgamation, within a single agency, of all police services in the province. The model would be the existing B.C. complement of the RCMP or the RCMP nationally, viewed as a single agency. All of the benefits of regionalization--administrative, operational, financial and professional--could be obtained under this model, just as they are achieved nationally by the RCMP. The policy objectives of the provincial government, with respect to effective community based policing throughout the province, also could be attained.

PROVINCIALIZATION WITH REGIONALIZATION

Provincialization could assume several forms. Complete provincialization would include the twelve independent municipal departments with all the RCMP detachments in one comprehensive provincial police force. Alternatively, the independent and RCMP police forces of the GVRD and the CRD could be reorganized into two or more regional forces and the other areas could remain either RCMP or provincial police jurisdictions.

It might be assumed that the provincial and municipal shares of the RCMP contracts eventually could rise to the point where alternatives would be considered. RCMP municipal detachments in the GVRD and the CRD then could become independent municipal forces or be regionalized, without a significant increase in costs to municipalities, if a decision were made to consolidate police services in the CRD and the GVRD. In the unincorporated areas the RCMP contract appears to accomplish the policing objectives of regionalization.

TIERED POLICE SERVICES

Some experts contend that highly-trained, sworn police officers should not be assigned to law enforcement duties that other personnel, having different qualifications and training, could perform equally well. They assert that it is not necessary and not cost-effective to train everyone engaged in law enforcement to the level of a sworn police officer. From these views the idea of "tiered" policing was developed, where several categories of personnel, with qualifications relevant to their responsibilities, carry out law enforcement duties that might not necessarily require the attention of sworn police officers.

The concept of "tiered" policing has many dimensions. At its simplest, tiered policing might consist of two levels: a patrol force or forces as a base, and a regionalized force providing central services as a tier above the base.

There could be other tiers, such as the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit and the Loss Prevention Division of the Liquor Distribution Branch. Forensic, legal and accounting investigators might form a tier. Air, marine and highway patrol might form a tier or tiers. Bylaw enforcement officers, parking meter officers and even private security officers might form additional tiers.

It is generally assumed that there also would be salary ranges, rising from the tier with the lowest educational and training requirements to the tier requiring the most education, training and experience.

CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISIONS

It has been suggested that, in the longer term, all public safety agencies in a region should be combined in a single organization responsible for police, fire, ambulance and perhaps some closely related services, such as family dispute intervention, victim assistance services and juvenile delinquency. This model--already partly in place in Esquimalt--could be a logical step toward integrating all provincial public safety services in a given metropolitan area, region or province.

CHAPTER FOUR

WHAT ABOUT COSTS?

COMPARING POLICE COSTS

Accurately measuring police costs is a complex matter. Wages and benefits are the easiest data to obtain. Capital costs and expenditures for rent, maintenance and other services are more difficult to estimate. Comparing costs among several police agencies is difficult because different cities may have different accounting systems. The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics and the provincial governments have tried to develop a reporting system that includes all police costs except the cost of buildings. This would tend to even out unusual increases due to construction of new buildings, while permitting comparisons of operating costs across jurisdictions.

Although a number of measures have been developed, none has yet been found that adequately identifies differences among police jurisdictions. One of the simplest calculations is cost-per-capita, derived by dividing the municipal police budget by the number of residents. If City X has a police budget of $10 million and a population of 100,000 residents, the cost per capita would be $100. Cost per capita is useful for municipal politicians and police executives to measure cost increases and decreases year by year within their own jurisdiction, but it is not a good measure for comparing agencies because it hides important differences among them, such as ratio of police to residents.

For example, City A might have a budget of $9 million, 165 police officers and 70,000 residents. The cost per capita for City A would be $128.57 ($9,000,000 divided by 70,000). The police to population ratio would be one officer per 424 residents (70,000 divided by 165), or 2.36 officers per 1000 population. City B might have a budget of $8 million, 113 police officers and 85,000 residents. The cost per capita would be $94.11 and the police to population ratio would be one officer per 750 residents, or 1.33 officers per 1,000 population. In this hypothetical case, City A police would appear to cost 36.6 percent more per capita than City B police. The cost per capita calculation, however, hides the fact that City A provides 77 percent more police per 1,000 population than City B.

The police budget as a proportion of the municipal budget also has been used as an indicator of police costs. This indicator has some value in comparing police expenditures in a given municipality over an extended period but is not of much value in comparing different jurisdictions unless they are known to have equivalent populations, tax bases and numbers of officers. Moreover, this indicator masks increases and decreases in other sectors of the municipal budget that may affect the percentage devoted to police without adding to or subtracting from the actual police budget.

Police expenditure per thousand dollars of assessed valuation is another method used to assess the cost of policing in comparison with other municipal services. In some cases this indicator has been used to compare costs among different jurisdictions.

Cost per thousand dollars of assessed valuation is helpful only when applied to comparable jurisdictions. In British Columbia, for example, the costs of the provincial RCMP contract to protect 600,000 rural residents (approximately $100.6 million in 1990-91) would be levied against an assessed valuation of only $2.7 billion, while the $137.5 million cost of protecting 908,500 residents of the independent municipalities would be levied against an assessed valuation of $7.2 billion.

For straightforward cost comparisons across police jurisdictions, "cost per officer" and "cost per police employee" are probably the most useful indicators. Cost per officer is derived by dividing the number of officers into the police budget. Cost per police employee is derived by dividing total staff, sworn and civilian, into the police budget.

Cost per officer provides a quick and reasonably accurate gross indicator. Cost per police employee is marginally more sophisticated because it may indicate the extent to which "civilianization" has been implemented in a given police department.

Central Saanich, for example, has a cost per officer of $72,375, but a cost per employee of only $52,636, due in some degree to the high percentage (37.5 percent) of civilian employees. Table II (following page) presents cost per officer and cost per police employee data from highest to lowest. Table III (page following Table II) provides RCMP cost data.

"Cost per officer" also has serious shortcomings as a measure of comparison across police departments. Difficulties arise when different police departments operate under significantly different circumstances. A comparison of Port Moody and Oak Bay is instructive in this regard.

Port Moody registered the highest cost per officer and Oak Bay the lowest among the twelve independent forces. At first glance, the two cities appear to be similar. In 1988, for example, Port Moody had about 16,000 residents; Oak Bay had about 17,600. Port Moody had twenty-five sworn and ten non-sworn employees; Oak Bay had twenty-three sworn and three non-sworn staff. The Port Moody Police budget was approximately $1,956,000; the Oak Bay police budget was approximately $1,398,000. The difference between the two budgets was $558,000. Using the rough measure of cost-per-officer, however, the difference between the two departments--about 17,500 per sworn employee--appeared to be inordinate.

There were important differences between the two cities, however. Oak Bay was a compact, settled, upper middle class residential community. The police force was staffed with seasoned officers, and little growth in the department was foreseen. The population was above the average in age. Usually there were people on the streets and in the houses during the day, a considerable deterrent to criminals. There were few places, such as taverns, video arcades and fast-food outlets, where people from outside Oak Bay might gather. The crime rate was 55 criminal code offenses per thousand residents, the lowest rate in the province.

Port Moody, on the other hand, was a rapidly expanding suburban community. The police force also was growing (the sworn force increased by 20 percent just between 1988 and 1990, with further growth expected). This caused expenditures for in-service training that were higher than in Oak Bay. Port Moody also had a growing population of younger people, a larger number of locations that might generate calls for police service, a major highway through the city and a large waterfront area. The crime rate was 108 criminal code offenses per thousand residents, double the rate in Oak Bay.

The high level of police response necessary in Port Moody produced overtime, court and legal costs, and civilian salary costs, that were well above the expenditures in Oak Bay. The level of criminal activity compelled Port Moody to employ ten civilian staff, freeing sworn personnel for street duty. Oak Bay required only three civilians and was able to use some officers for dispatch duties. Port Moody, of necessity, provided 20 percent more police per thousand residents than Oak Bay provided.

This combination of factors produced an apparent difference in cost per officer that seemed to be significant. In fact, salaries and benefits for sworn personnel are essentially identical in the eleven independent departments of the GVRD and CRD.

The extra costs were due entirely to conditions existing in Port Moody that did not exist in Oak Bay. The Port Moody police force is well-managed and provides effective and cost-efficient service to the community it serves.

This comparison of Port Moody and Oak Bay indicates again how difficult it is to compare the costs of policing in different police forces serving different communities. Cost per officer is a blunt instrument like all the others described here, and should be used with great caution.

TABLE II

ESTIMATED COSTS PER OFFICER AND COST PER POLICE EMPLOYEE IN THE GVRD AND CRD, 1990/1991

DEPARTMENT	COST PER OFFICER	HIGH TO LOW	DEPARTMENT	COST PER POLICE EMPLOYEE *
PORT MOODY	93,522	1	ESQUIMALT	69,244
CENTRAL SAANICH	87,141	2	NEW WESTMINSTER	68,645
NEW WESTMINSTER	86,673	3	PORT MOODY	66,801
ESQUIMALT	82,577	4	CENTRAL SAANICH	64,407
SAANICH	78,633	5	VANCOUVER	64,115
VANCOUVER	78,056	6	SAANICH	63,979
DELTA	77,196	7	OAK BAY	63,371
VICTORIA	75,357	8	DELTA	62,271
MATSQUI	74,975	9	WEST VANCOUVER	60,823
WEST VANCOUVER	74,726	10	VICTORIA	60,363
OAK BAY	74,392	11	MATSQUI	54,036

* Includes sworn and civilian staff.

Table III

R. C. M. P.: ESTIMATED 1990/91 PER MEMBER COSTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
TYPE OF FORCE	"Basic" RCMP Cost Per Member	Div. Admin Per Member	Recruit Training Per Member	SUBTOTAL	P.I.R.S. Per Member	Overtime Per Member	TOTAL 100% Contract Costs Per Member	Per Member Contract Costs Borne By: PROV MUN FED	Average Per Member Costs Over and Above Contract Paid By MUN	TOTAL Per Member Contract Cost Plus Over and Above Paid By: PROV MUN FED	GRAND TOTAL PER MEMBER COSTS
PROVINCIAL FORCE	$85,550 (inc. support staff, accommodation, etc.)	$6,700	$1,300	$93,550	$450	$3,000	$97,000	70% --- 30% $67,900 --- $29,100	------	$67,900 --- $29,100	$97,000
"EXTENDED" MUNICIPALITIES	$85,550 (inc. support staff, accommodation, etc.)	$6,700	$1,300	$93,550	$450	$3,000	$97,000	----- 70% 30% ----- $67,900 $29,100	------	----- $67,900 $29,100	$97,000
MUNICIPAL FORCES 5,000-15,000 POP	$64,200 (excl. supp. staff, accommodation, etc.)	$6,700	$1,300	$72,200	$450	$2,400	$75,050	----- 70% 30% ----- $52,535 $22,515	$17,000 (inc. support staff, accommodation, etc.)	----- $69,535 $22,515	$92,050
MUNICIPAL FORCES OVER 15,000 POP	Average= $63,700 (excl. supp. staff, accommodation, etc.) ($61,000 - $67,800)	$6,700	$1,300	Average= $71,700 ($69,000-$75,800)	$450	$3,000	Average= $75,150	----- 90% 10% ----- $67,635 $7,510	$17,000 (inc. support staff, accommodation, etc.)	----- $84,635 $7,510	$92,145

DATA QUALIFIERS

(1) "Basic" RCMP Cost Per Member: (Column 1)
- salaries and benefits of sworn police members (with pension contributions are calculated at 12% of members' pay);
- personal supplies such as members' kits, firearms, ammunition, and protective gear;
- rental or purchase of office supplies and equipment;
- rental or purchase of communications equipment; and,
- purchase, repair and maintenance of vehicles, boats, planes, as well as other equipment such as breathelyzers and radars.

For the Provincial Force, "Basic" RCMP costs per member also include support staff, accommodation, and lock-up costs.
For the Municipal Forces, "Basic" RCMP costs per member exclude support staff, accommodation and lock-up costs. The RCMP Agreement and the Police Act state that support staff, accommodation and lock-up costs will be provided and paid for entirely by the municipality and will not be cost shared.
Municipalities Between 5-15,000 Population: These 20 cities pool all their RCMP contract costs and divide by their aggregate police strength to produce a per member rate common to them all. Because these forces are smaller, this "pooling" of costs results in a more stable per member rate from year to year.
Municipalities Over 15,000 Population: Unlike the smaller cities, the 23 municipalities over 15,000 do not pool their costs. These municipalities receive an estimate from the Federal government based on the projected cost of RCMP policing in their city, and therefore their estimated per member cost is unique to each one.

(2) Div. Admin Per Member: (Column 2)
The centrally located functions required to administer all federal, provincial, and municipal RCMP resources in the province are referred to as Division Administration or "Div. Admin", such as:
- CO's Office (plus audit; staff relations reps; planning and research; management services);
- Administration & Personnel (such as payroll; all medical, dental, and other health services; staffing & personnel);
- Financial Services and Supply
- Informatics
- Record Services

(3) Overtime Per Member: (Column 6)
These are estimates based on an estimate of the total number of overtime hours times the estimated hourly rate. For the Provincial force this is included in the estimates submitted to us from the Federal government. For the Municipal forces, we have estimated these amounts by multiplying the total number of overtime hours worked in the previous year times the estimated hourly rate in Fiscal Year 1990/91.

PREPARED BY: Police Services Branch, Ministry of Solicitor General, Province of British Columbia DATE: June 26, 1990

WHO SHOULD PAY?

The question of payment invariably is raised when consolidation of police services in B.C. is discussed. The two most common questions, aside from "will the cost to my municipality increase?", are "which government will pay the start-up costs?" and "where will the money come from?" The most common proposal by municipal and police officials is that the provincial government underwrite the start-up costs of any changes.

The provincial government has provided strong leadership in the past and has established necessary services at the provincial level. Among the accomplishments of the government, with respect to policing, are:

- Police Act
- Police Commission
- Police Services Branch
- Justice Institute
- Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit
- Independent Police Equalization Grants
- Counter Attack Program
- Police Reserve Auxiliary Program
- Victim Services Program
- Payment of part of police training costs at the JIBC
- Sheriffs
- Keep of Prisoners

What more might the provincial government do? Numerous options have been identified:

1. The provincial government could provide centralized support services for the independent municipal police forces, just as the federal government provides for the RCMP and the provincial governments of Ontario and Quebec provide for their provincial forces. Examples could include air and marine support, divers, major crimes squads, and forensic services.

2. The provincial government could establish minimum standards for police finance, administration and operations that municipal governments would be required to meet. It has been suggested that the government could, by this action, achieve effective policing without forcing regionalization on unwilling municipal governments (N.B. a start has been made by the B.C. Police Commission to establish provincial standards against which departments may be measured through periodic audits).

3. Responsibility for staffing and managing lockups could be transferred to the provincial corrections system, maintaining prisoners at no direct cost to municipalities. This could reduce police costs, allegations of police misconduct with respect to prisoners and the cost of new police buildings.

4. A mandatory central purchasing system could be established for all standard police equipment, to grant, lease or sell materials at cost to the municipalities. The significant savings obtained through central purchasing, from automobiles to business forms, should not be foregone because local authorities may favour local purchasing regardless of cost.

5. To establish parity among the police agencies in B.C. and to raise the level of professionalism of B.C. police officers, all costs could be paid by the provincial government for all departments for training police recruits at the Justice Institute; or, a modest maintenance allowance could be paid for all recruits with salaries delayed until training has been successfully completed.
6. Air and marine patrols could be strengthened by the provincial government paying the personnel and capital costs, so that all metropolitan waterfront and related areas are policed to acceptable levels.
7. The provincial government could establish provincial patrols to control traffic; for example, from Vancouver to Matsqui, and from Victoria to Sidney;
8. Existing standards for forensic laboratories could be reviewed and improvements made if necessary, with the province paying the costs.
9. The province could underwrite or share with the federal government the costs of acquiring adequate radio communications equipment linking all police departments in the province.
10. All police departments could be required to obtain the latest, best, compatible computer systems and underwrite the initial cost.
11. To advance the best NCOs and commissioned officers, the province could require that promotions in municipal departments be open to province-wide competition according to standards for each position established by the province in consultation with municipal police chiefs, police boards and police unions, according to rules established by the province with respect to acting or temporary appointments.
12. Municipalities could be reimbursed by the province where it can be demonstrated that new provincial policies cause the unplanned expenditure of municipal police resources.

WHERE WOULD THE MONEY COME FROM?

It has been suggested that the provincial government could:

1. Restructure the IPEG program to achieve better police service. An example would be using part of the IPEG funds intended for Vancouver, Victoria, Esquimalt, Saanich and Oak Bay to purchase PIRS for those police departments, thus unifying police computer systems throughout the province;

or, IPEG funds could be used to underwrite start-up costs for municipalities that agree to consolidate their police forces, for example the Tri-Cities Region, the Saanich Peninsula Region, the North-West Vancouver Region, and the CRD;

or, IPEG funds could be used to instal state-of-the-art police radio communications across the province, beginning with the GVRD and the CRD;

or, the IPEG program could be discontinued but costs paid to the twelve independent municipal forces to improve communications and identification technology and to unify the regional and provincial systems;

or, the IPEG funds could be distributed based on an equitable per capita formula. In 1990 in British Columbia, some residents pay a small percentage of the cost of police protection, some pay 70 percent, some pay 90 percent and some pay 100 percent of the full cost.

Municipal and police officials have noted that the distribution of IPEG funds, though well meant, was not based on ability to pay and is not equitable.

Municipality	Total	Per Capita
Central Saanich	$340,736	$27.98
New Westminster	$724,730	$17.64
West Vancouver	$512,435	$13.12
Victoria	$777,905	$11.58
Esquimalt	$190,333	$11.55
Oak Bay	$168,372	$ 9.57
Matsqu	$455,457	$ 8.09
Delta	$487,963	$ 5.96
Saanich	$443,534	$ 5.10
Vancouver	$757,867	$ 1.70

2. The province could assume complete responsibility for the costs of provincial and municipal police services in the province and recover 100 percent of costs through equitable province-wide taxation for police protection. If this option were implemented:

- the leadership role of the provincial government in police and law enforcement policy could be immeasurably strengthened
- there would be no need for special police grants
- there could be more equity across the province in paying for police protection
- the costs of police training would not fall disproportionately on any region
- the provincial government could achieve most of the operational and financial objectives of police agency consolidation, while ensuring that satisfactory levels of patrol service and local identification were maintained in the smaller municipalities.

WHAT ABOUT TAXES?

The taxpayers of British Columbia, in 1990/91, will spend about $351 million for police protection. This included $100.6 million for the provincial RCMP contract; $113 million for the forty-three RCMP municipal contracts and $137.5 million for the twelve independent municipalities. If the provincial government were to reorganize the police system in whole or in part, the tax system might also be rationalized to pay for the new public safety system.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOME OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

During the course of the regionalization study, elected civic leaders, appointed municipal officials, senior police executives and other experts in law enforcement expressed a wide range of views about the future of policing in British Columbia. The spectrum of proposals was broad, and the implications flowing from them profound. They are presented and discussed here as options and considerations.

A LEADERSHIP ROLE FOR THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF B.C.

There is strong consensus that a comprehensive police policy leadership role for the provincial Ministry of Solicitor General should be developed. The need for vigourous and committed leadership in law enforcement and public safety today and for the next decade is particularly evident. The provincial government should be recognized by all to provide that leadership.

In British Columbia, the Ministry of Solicitor General is quite new. The leadership role has not yet fully evolved, but a great deal has been accomplished. Over the years provincial initiatives raised the quality of police service and reduced direct policing costs. Nevertheless, the measures tended to be piecemeal and uncoordinated. There was no comprehensive plan within which the programs evolved, and funds were not allocated in a strategic or equitable manner.

Given the existing costly and sometimes counter-productive duplication of police services and the expected arrival of up to a million more residents during the next decade, there are compelling reasons for the provincial government to rationalize the police computer and communication systems in the GVRD and CRD, initiate the first stages of police consolidation and develop an equitable and comprehensive method of funding municipal and provincial police services.

Improving computer and communications systems

Inadequate communications systems severely limit the ability of police agencies and police officers to communicate within and across jurisdictions. Most existing systems are not secure from unauthorized monitoring, do not incorporate adequate alternative parallel networks and lack interoperability features that facilitate faster and easier operation.

Effective policing would require rationalizing the computer systems in the GVRD and CRD. The Vancouver City Police Department has a computerized information system that is incompatible with both the Police Information Retrieval System (PIRS) used by all other municipal and RCMP jurisdictions in the GVRD, and with the system used by the Victoria, Saanich, Oak Bay and Esquimalt police. PIRS for Vancouver, at $450 per officer, would cost approximately $450,000 per year.

Victoria, Oak Bay, Esquimalt and Saanich share the Search Entry And Retrieval Crime History system (SEARCH) that is incompatible with the Vancouver system and with the PIRS used by Central Saanich, all RCMP detachments and the other independent municipal forces in the GVRD. PIRS for CRD officers, at $450 per officer, would cost about $145,000 per year.

IPEG funds allocated to the four cities ($1,580,144) and to Vancouver ($757,867) would more than cover the cost if the government directed the use of the funds to this purpose.

There are seven separate 9-1-1 answering points in the CRD, as opposed to one for the GVRD. It might require a provincial directive to impose a less costly system on the CRD, but taxpayers and persons seeking emergency aid would be the beneficiaries.

One CRD Department has a computerized crime-occurrence mapping system that could serve the entire CRD at a minuscule additional cost. One other police department is creating one of its own. A further portion of IPEG funds could be applied to developing and managing of a CRD-wide mapping system that would be of significant long term value to police officers.

Consolidation of police forces in the CRD: The first stage

There may never be a better time to act. Municipal police executives and political leaders are unanimous in their belief that nothing will be done to rationalize and improve police organization in the CRD unless the provincial government takes the lead role. That leadership is, of course, meaningless unless given in an atmosphere of willingness by the police and municipal leaders to adopt a flexible attitude towards new initiatives.

The existing police organization and the state of municipal finances, combined with the immediate need for computer-linked criminal identification and enhanced police communications systems, present an opportunity for the provincial government to begin the consolidation process. The Minister's authority to proceed is set out in Section 4.1 of the **Police Act.** Most senior police executives in the CRD and across the province, whether independent municipal or RCMP, believe this course to be both progressive and inevitable.

Regionalization could start in the CRD because:

1. There are five police forces with 338 officers protecting a total population of about 201,000, equal to that of Surrey. (The RCMP polices Surrey with 245 officers. Crime rates in the two areas are essentially the same).
2. The five cities in effect have contiguous borders and the populations are not separated by natural barriers or sparsely populated rural areas.
3. The limits of cooperation among departments "to get the job done" seem to have been reached.
4. Formal agreements among departments to improve service are no longer adequate.
5. Computer and communications systems serving the five departments are not coordinated.
6. Significant capital costs are envisioned for several CRD police departments in the near future but a cooperative approach has not been adopted by the municipal governments.
7. A high level of integration of personnel and equipment will be necessary when the Commonwealth Games are held in 1994.
8. A regionalization plan prepared by the CRD area chiefs is available for implementation.

9. Additional personnel being recruited by CRD departments probably would not be needed if the five forces were consolidated.

Pay the start-up costs of CRD regionalization

There are start-up costs associated with regionalization, such as changeover of insignia, adoption of new procedures, buy-outs of some senior or long-service employees, and equalization of wages and benefits. Many senior police and municipal officials believe that, if rationalization of public safety agencies is to be accomplished, the provincial government could consider underwriting some or all of the start-up costs.

Underwrite 100% of police training costs at the Justice Institute

Officials of the independent municipalities on Vancouver Island assert that it is unfair that they must provide maintenance (about $7,000 per candidate) for recruits undergoing training at the Justice Institute. Municipalities on the Lower Mainland do not incur this expense because their recruits can go home at night. The provincial government could consider underwriting these extra costs to the five core cities, as an additional benefit of regionalization.

Build CRD regional headquarters

There is a need in several core city departments for new police headquarters buildings. If regionalization were initiated, one building adequate for all CRD departments could be constructed.

Appoint an independent chairman for the CRD regional police board

The chairman of the regional or metropolitan police board on which the municipal mayors would serve should be a respected independent person appointed by the Minister, at least for the first three to five years. Alternatively, the mayors could succeed one-another as chairman for one-year terms possibly starting with the mayor of the smallest municipal force at the time of consolidation and proceeding in reverse order of departmental size.

Find the first regional chief through a national competition

The regional chief should be the most qualified applicant in a national competition and should be chosen by a board of experts appointed by the Minister. Municipal politicians and police board members could form a committee to interview the applicants but should not be responsible for the final decision.

Hire the regional chief on contract

The first chief should be appointed and hired under contract to the metropolitan police board for a five year term. Performance objectives should be included in the contract, to ensure that policing objectives were clearly stated and that the chief understood the criteria against which he would be evaluated by the police board. Hiring under contract would provide the flexibility necessary for employing and replacing the senior police executive.

Include performance measures in the employment contract governing the regional chief that guarantee existing policies for response to calls for service

The standard arguments against regionalization can easily be rebutted on the basis of recent Canadian evidence. With respect to police response to calls for service, however, the concerns of officials in the core cities must be respected. Concern over the preservation of the perceived quality of existing police service is the most important issue underlying opposition to consolidation.

Appoint the regional chief and senior subordinates at the earliest possible time

The selection of a new chief and senior staff for the consolidated force should be done early in the process. There are several compelling reasons for timely action:

1. Early appointment of the metropolitan chief and his senior subordinates would significantly improve the quality of the planning process and enable consolidation to occur at the earliest possible date. The new chief and his colleagues could be aided in their work by reference to the regionalization plan produced by the CRD area chiefs in 1986 (see Appendix E).
2. The policies and objectives of the new administration could be known well in advance of implementation, and the mayors and police boards could be assured that their individual concerns had been taken into account.
3. There is now a "window of opportunity" with respect to the serving chiefs in the CRD. The current Victoria chief will be leaving in less than eighteen months and the other area chiefs within the next five years. The window will close if new permanent chiefs replace the present incumbents. This could lead to costly buy-outs that might otherwise be avoided.

Police and fire consolidation in the CRD: The second stage

One of the most comprehensive proposals, suggested by several different experts, was to consolidate public service agencies that combine police, fire and other emergency services.

Municipalities that have created Public Safety Departments generally put about 100 percent more police patrols on the street than do traditional departments, reduce fire losses, pay premium wages and provide the most desirable shift schedules, at less cost and with less staff overall than traditional fire and police agencies. Fires account for only about 5 percent of the work of combined agencies. Moreover, as municipal governments introduce legislation governing mandatory smoke alarms and sprinkler systems, the incidence of serious fires and fire loss should continue to decrease.

Evidence from American and Canadian jurisdictions indicates that combined forces provide a louder "bang for the buck" without reducing the quality of fire or police services. One significant supporting factor is that insurance rates are not higher in areas with combined forces than they are in areas with traditional forces. Moreover, there are no additional costs to municipalities that combine police and fire services. Reports indicate significant savings in both the short and long terms, in addition to better police and fire protection (see Appendix F).

This option would be subjected to intense scrutiny by all interested parties, and some further study is warranted.

The Ministry of Solicitor General should take responsibility for provincial fire safety training and regulation

This would follow logically from the preceding option.

Regionalization and police-fire consolidation in the GVRD

Some observers think that regionalization and police-fire consolidation in the CRD and the GVRD could eliminate the need to hire additional personnel or to increase current police and fire budgets for the remainder of the decade. This would be a significant saving. Given the expected increas in population, it has been estimated that about 700 additional police officers would be needed by the year 2000 in the GVRD alone.

DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA POLICE SERVICES

The RCMP provides an excellent example of the capability of a central government to provide a police organization by establishing standards for recruiting, training, operations and management, and providing the police college, forensic laboratories, identification and informatics services, a national criminal intelligence service, highway patrols, air and marine services, and contract policing. The governments of Ontario and Quebec, to a large degree, have used the federal example.

The government of British Columbia has gone part way toward a provincial police administration. Many police executives think that the government could now go beyond other provinces and develop a fully integrated public safety and emergency response.

Initiate additional air, marine and highway patrols where needed

There appears to be a need for improved air, marine and highway patrols but no single jurisdiction is responsible and no municipality will underwrite the cost of services that are not strictly local.

Require that police recruits complete basic training Blocks I, II & III at the Justice Institute before being hired and paid

Many senior police officers and police trainers believe that the police service must eventually match the educational standards of other professions. Therefore, it has been suggested that a beginning could be made (and significant savings achieved) if police recruits were required to complete Blocks I, II and III of their training before being hired by police agencies. Lawyers and doctors, for example complete their education--usually at their own expense--before they are permitted to practice. Alternatively, a larger percentage of the training costs could be underwritten by the government, including living costs for qualified candidates who could not otherwise afford to undertake the training.

Centralize the recruitment and selection process at the Justice Institute

Recruitment through the Justice Institute seemed to some participants to present a classic example of the advantages of consolidation and economy of scale. The independent police forces devote a significant amount of resources to the recruitment and selection process, before training begins. There are, nevertheless, common standards accepted by the chief constables, and the can-

didates from one department are essentially identical to those recruited by the other departments. Police managers at the level of staff sergeant advertise for recruits, interview and select candidates and are involved in a good deal of administration. The various written tests, however, are supervised by the Justice Institute.

The chief constables agree that the Justice Institute is well-prepared and well-suited to carry out the entire function, relieving the departments of a time-consuming administrative task and rationalizing the process across the province.

A centralized process could result in a wider search for personnel within B.C. and the recruitment of larger percentages of female and minority officers. The administration of well-publicized annual or semi-annual qualifying examinations at various locations outside the GVRD and CRD would be a relatively simple task for the Justice Institute. Successful candidates could undergo background investigations and be placed on an eligibility list. Hiring policies with respect to women and minorities could be implemented.

Establish professional educational standards for recruitment

Police experts with strong interests in education suggested that the government could establish a standard, effective January 1, 1995, that every police recruit should hold a diploma from a community college or have completed two years of university study with passing grades. On January 1, 2000, or sooner, the standard could be raised to a completed baccalaureate degree if this were an agreed goal.

Candidates could be required to obtain the necessary educational qualification prior to recruitment, just as school teachers must obtain the requisite diplomas before being considered for employment. Higher standards, phased in over a decade, would not affect individuals now serving as constables, cadets or reserves and would be known well in advance to persons wishing to pursue a career in law enforcement.

Establish bursaries for recruit training and post graduate university study

A number of police experts suggested that the provincial government could establish a system of bursaries for candidates who had completed undergraduate studies in a relevant field but who were unable to support themselves through Blocks I to III at the Justice Institute. The Ministry could ensure, through a contract with the student, that the individual would serve as a police officer for a minimum of five years after graduation or be required to repay the full amount of the bursary.

The government also could further the professionalization of the police service by providing bursaries to qualified serving officers for post-graduate university study in specified critical areas such as ethnic relations, dispute resolution, public administration, and criminology. The bursaries could be awarded through competition and the same conditions could apply with respect to obligatory police service after graduation.

Underwrite policing costs throughout the province

There was a very strong consensus among the chief constables that the most direct way to reorganize policing in B.C. would be to adopt the federal model. That is, the government could underwrite the costs of municipal and provincial police, and bill the towns and cities for the service, either directly or through provincial taxation. Municipal officials could then accept the

changes that must be made if residents of British Columbia are to receive the protective services that many police executives believe are needed. The provincial government could achieve several beneficial results:

1. The foundations for a unified provincial public safety service could be put in place.
2. Economies of scale in personnel, operating and maintenance costs that result from centralization and rationalization could be realized, thus reducing the overall cost of police service.
3. Increased effectiveness could be achieved through a unified command system.
4. The provincial government would have increased ability to deal directly and quickly with new situations, such as youth gangs or crime on rapid transit systems, that tend to affect only one or two jurisdictions and are therefore unfairly seen as local problems, or that affect many jurisdictions and are seen as someone else's problem.
5. Province-wide recruitment and training standards could be raised to professional levels in keeping with the challenges of the twenty-first century and the professional salaries already paid to police officers.
6. Performance measures based on provincial policies could be written into police job descriptions from chief to third-class constable, and a reward system based on those policies could be developed.
7. The rise in police costs could be slowed because there might be no need to hire more police or fire personnel for the rest of the decade. Furthermore, for a significant period it might not be necessary to increase the combined police-fire budget. Given the predicted 1.19 million increase in the provincial population by the year 2011, this would be an important consideration.
8. If the province took full responsibility, then the municipal governments could gain because annual expenditures amounting to about 15 percent of the municipal budgets could be lifted from the property tax levy.

OTHER OPTIONS

The provincially funded, regionalized, fire-police-paramedical public safety proposal would appear to provide the most cost-efficient option, the most effective use of personnel and the organization most amenable to timely change due to centralized command. If this option were not adopted, several other proposals might be considered.

Voluntary regionalization-combination and provincial strategic grants

The government could encourage regionalization and police-fire-ambulance combination by offering substantial grants per capita to municipal governments that agreed to reorganize their police and fire departments. The amount of the grant could depend on the extent of reorganization, for example 100 percent of the per capita grant for a full regionalization with police-fire-paramedical combination; 50 percent for regionalization or combination alone.

Strategic use of IPEG funds

Many participants in the study proposed that, regardless of other considerations, if the IPEG program were continued the funds could be used to encourage municipalities to follow provincial police policies, initially with respect to computer and communication equipment. Most thought that it would be fairer if IPEG funds were allocated per capita in lieu of the present formula.

PROVINCIAL RECOVERY OF PUBLIC SAFETY COSTS

If the provincial government decided to underwrite police expenditures throughout the province, it would be necessary to recover the funds expended.

A public safety tax

The cost of provincial and municipal police in British Columbia in 1990-91, excluding federal shares, will be approximately $351 million. This sum was derived as follows:

- provincial RCMP contract 100,600,000
- 43 municipal RCMP contracts 113,000,000
- 12 independent municipalities 137,500,000

The assumption by the provincial government of full responsibility for policing costs would have required additional expenditures of $251 million; that is, the costs of the municipal RCMP plus independent municipal forces. How a public safety tax might be administered and upon what sources of revenue it might be levied would require extensive study.

RECONSIDER THE BENEFIT TO B.C. OF THE RCMP CONTRACTS

The benefit of the RCMP contract to B.C. was very clear in 1950, when the federal police force absorbed the B.C. Provincial Police. Under the first agreement, the federal government paid sixty percent of the cost, thus reducing the cost to the provincial government by that amount. This benefit continued for about three decades, until the federal government began to increase gradually the costs to the provincial and municipal governments.

In 1991, at the end of the current ten-year agreement, the percentages paid under the provincial and municipal contracts will be, respectively, seventy percent and ninety percent of the total cost as calculated by the RCMP. The percentages could increase when the contracts are renewed. If ongoing studies indicate that the RCMP cost per officer is approximately equal to the cost per municipal officer, the provincial government might consider the benefits of establishing an integrated police agency to police the province.

One of the issues to be assessed in the context of cost is the question of gains in police accountability to the citizens of British Columbia with a B.C. force, as opposed to an RCMP force whose prime focus for policing direction is Ottawa.

SUMMARY

This study indicates that regionalization of police forces can improve services and be cost effective. The Canadian literature supports the perspective that larger forces can provide better service without increasing costs to the tax payer. Although some political leaders oppose regionalization, law enforcement experts across the province generally view regionalization as a necessary and perhaps inevitable development.

The suggested forms of regionalization, however, range from a single force for the whole province to single forces for the GVRD and CRD to numerous other arrangements. Consolidation of police, fire and other emergency services also was suggested.

If policing is to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, we must focus on police accountability, police efficiency and the involvement of the community in the setting of policy and priorities.

APPENDIX A

THE OSTROM THESIS: NOT APPLICABLE IN CANADA

Elinor Ostrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of Indiana at Bloomington. In the early 1970's, Ostrom and her colleagues studied the comparative effectiveness of small and large police forces in the United States. They concluded that small police departments allocated a higher proportion of officers to the patrol function than did large departments, although they were unable to specify what effect that might have on public safety.

Given Professor Ostrom's conviction that the structure of government affects the operations of subordinate agencies, she would be unlikely to extend her interpretation of her research findings to jurisdictions outside the United States. Ostrom's work, nevertheless, has been raised by some municipal representatives in the Capital Regional District and local academics, in the context of the regionalization study commissioned in 1989 by the Police Services Branch of the Ministry of Solicitor General of British Columbia. The relevant research, therefore, has been reviewed for the benefit of provincial and municipal officials who have not read these studies.

Several summary points may be made. First, the Ostrom research was undertaken long ago and far away. The studies were conducted in 1970, 1973 and 1974-75, in Indianapolis, St. Louis and across the U.S.A. by a large mail survey in 85 metropolitan areas. These studies were "snapshots" of particular jurisdictions at a given moment, without depth or breadth, and have little relevance in the U.S.A., let alone in British Columbia in 1990. Second, Ostrom discounted most direct measures of police productivity and created subjective "outputs" that were measured almost entirely by public attitude surveys. Third, Ostrom ignored influential contemporary research that challenged her "findings" with respect to police patrol and response times, two of her central measures of "output." Fourth, Ostrom rejected the opinions of every important U.S. federal or state commission on policing, in that all commissions favoured some sort of consolidation. Fifth, no notable American police expert publicly supported Ostrom and opposed regionalization as a concept.

In brief, it may safely be asserted that the questions that concerned Ostrom two decades ago are not the questions that concern British Columbians today. The police and the public have been brought together in communities across Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.A. through innovative organization and programs, without foregoing the benefits of full-service police forces.(1)

In the United States, since the early 1960's, there has been a fairly strong sentiment among law enforcement officials in favour of the rationalization of American police services. Police officials and other experts were impelled by the rising rate of crime to propose alternatives to the status quo, one of which was "regionalization" of small forces to produce larger, presumably more effective, "full service" police agencies. The report of the President's Commission, in 1967, may be viewed as the initiation, at the highest levels, of strong policy recommendations directed to a significant reduction in the number of police jurisdictions. At the time, there were about 40,000, of which about 30,000 employed ten officers or less.(2)

Ostrom and her graduate students at the University of Indiana challenged the assertion that a host of small police forces was less effective than a few larger departments in "delivering" protective services to the public. Ostrom had studied the administration of American municipal government and American municipal services, and had concluded that large cities were less efficient than small cities in the provision of some services to the public. Ostrom observed that although many federal, state and county commissions had proposed regionalization as a means to

increase the effectiveness of police agencies, no "empirical" evidence had been introduced to justify their opinions.(3)

Ostrom identified a "Bill of Indictment" that commissions had levelled against small police departments. The charge was "inadequate performance," the particulars of which were set out in three "Articles" drawn from published reports:

I. "An extravagant number of minuscule local governments hurts in many ways. Lilliputian governments essentially lack the territory and population to solve area wide problems, or to render effective services."(4)

"Fragmented local government also means splintered law enforcement, with overlapping jurisdictions, petty jealousies and rivalries, poor or nonexistent communication networks, inadequate training."(5)

II. "American police protection is extremely decentralized in nature. Nearly every local government attempts to provide some form of police services. Yet, the service adequacy of many police departments may well be open to serious question. Surveys of the efficiency of small and undersized police forces indicate that their personnel are poorly trained, poorly organized, and overworked. Consequently, small agencies frequently provide an extremely low quality of service."(6)

III. "Small local departments, particularly those of ten or fewer men, are unable to provide a wide range of investigative services to local citizens. Moreover, the existence of these small agencies may work a hardship on nearby jurisdictions. Small police departments which do not have adequate full-time patrol and preliminary investigative services may require the aid of larger agencies in many facets of their police work."(7)

Ostrom set out to examine these charges, which many observers believed to be self-evident. She and her colleagues studied twenty-nine police agencies in the metropolitan area of St. Louis, Missouri. Nine of the forces employed ten or fewer officers, one had 2200, one had 422, and the rest had between eleven and seventy-six officers. Ostrom developed "a variety of individual indicators" that, in her opinion, showed the criticisms of small police agencies to be unfounded.(8)

Ostrom's conclusions are open to question. The most gaping hole in the thesis is Ostrom's acknowledgement that provision of central services such as communications, major crimes squads and recruit training were necessary and depended entirely on the existence of nearby large, full-service departments. Oddly enough, Ostrom found this to be the key to the preservation of small departments that, she admitted, could not provide full services to their municipalities.(9)

Professor Ostrom subsequently obtained a research grant from the National Science Foundation to study the effects of agency size on police performance and to present empirical findings. (N.B. The word "empirical" in the context of social science research does not take its dictionary meaning of "observed," but refers to inferences that may be drawn from statistical formulations). She and her associates sent questionnaires to 1,454 police forces in eighty metropolitan areas, requesting answers to a range of questions that they thought might identify the quality of service provided by American police departments. Interviews with police officials and surveys of public opinion were included in the study, which took place between June, 1974 and May, 1975.(10)

Ostrom explained that:

> We view metropolitan policing in America as an industry with agencies delivering a variety of police services directly to citizens. In producing those direct services, police agencies use a variety of auxiliary services which they either produce for themselves or obtain from other agencies.
>
> We find that police agencies and citizens already have available to them most of the services deemed essential to effective police activity. We will point out that while many police departments do not themselves supply all of these services, **the police industry as a whole does.**(11)

Three services were examined: patrol, traffic control and criminal investigation. Ostrom found duplication of services in less than half of the eighty areas, relatively few overlapping jurisdictions, and lots of coordination and cooperation. (Duplication of services meant that in less than half of the areas did two agencies supply the same service to the same public; there was plenty of the duplication that occurs when several independent forces in an area provide standard police services to their individual municipalities). Again, the availability of special services from full-service departments was presented as a fundamental rationale for the continued existence of small police forces.(12)

Given that small departments could not provide all the required services, why preserve them? Because, in Ostrom's opinion, small departments put proportionately more officers on patrol than did large departments; e.g.:

"In departments with fewer than five full-time officers, the chief is a regular part of the patrol force."

"Departments with ten or fewer officers assign, on average, more than 90 percent of their officers to patrol."

"Municipal departments with more than 150 officers average less than 60 percent of their officers assigned to patrol."

"While many larger municipal departments have more sworn officers per 1000 residents than do small departments, they are less able to translate this personnel advantage into as great an on-street patrol presence."

"It would seem that **more**, not fewer, officers would be needed (in a consolidated force) to maintain current patrol densities in the areas now patrolled by small departments."(13)

Patrol presence, therefore, was the main reason provided by Ostrom for the preservation of small departments. Conversely, and this is important, Ostrom made a point of **warning** that her findings "should not be interpreted as demonstrating that small departments are more effective at protecting the people they serve. The consequences of increased numbers of officers on patrol remain to be demonstrated."(14) Indeed, she asserted that "We have no evidence to contribute to the current debate about the **benefits** of having more officers on patrol."(15)

What is to be made of these contradictory statements? From the tone of Professor Ostrom's published work it could easily be inferred that she had an ideological preference for small organizations, e.g.:

> If state criminal justice planning agencies across the country accept the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals' recommended standard for minimum size of police agencies and if local governments act on this

> standard, more than 30,000 police agencies across the country will disappear. Nearly 90 percent of the police departments serving the country would be eliminated.
>
> N.B. The 90 percent of agencies employed only 10 percent of the sworn officers).(16)

This apparent preference, which evidently precipitated Professor Ostrom's research on police agencies, also produced rhetorical flourishes that led her far from the facts; e.g.:

> The myopia which magnifies and distorts the alleged shortcomings of small police departments has also created substantial blindness in failing to examine the potential shortcomings of the very large police departments.(17)

In reality, the large American departments have been studied repeatedly over the years, and the bulk of relevant U.S. literature and most North American police reform is based on those research inquiries.

In her earlier work Ostrom found that small departments cost more per capita than larger ones, but took this as proof that the small department was providing a higher level of service. Later, she asserted that small departments cost less per capita than large departments. Her results, however, show that the range of the per capita costs of the large, full-service departments in the St. Louis area fell within the range of the per capita costs of the small departments. Ostrom interpreted these findings such that "it would be difficult to argue that small departments are less efficient,"(18) but to many observers it would seem certainly less efficient if a small department providing only patrol service cost as much per capita as a large, full-service department.

Ostrom attempted to rebut two comments that challenged the viability of small forces: William P. Browne's statement that a police force should be of sufficient size to attract chiefs "informed enough to handle the problems that will confront them"; and former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark's question--"What is the career opportunity for a bright and ambitious young officer in a twenty-man force?" Unfortunately, Ostrom's flawed critique rested on her own suspect measures of "output," obtained from public attitude surveys about other aspects of police work. It provided no analysis of the issues.(19)

APPLICABILITY IN CANADA

The competence of the chiefs of the Greater Vancouver Regional District and Capital Regional District police departments is not in question and these issues would therefore seem to be irrelevant. It is nevertheless true that, of the eleven incumbent chiefs in April 1990, only three had been promoted from within their own departments. Of the three, two had experience in other departments before moving to British Columbia. Only the chief of the Vancouver Police Department had served his entire career in his own department.

In 1990, among the eleven chiefs of independent municipal departments in the GVRD and CRD, there were five from the Vancouver Police Department, four from the R.C.M.P., one from Esquimalt Police Department by way of the Winnipeg Police Department, and one from the Saanich Police Department by way of two Scottish police forces. This strong "outside" influence also was apparent in the backgrounds of the predecessors of the eleven incumbent chiefs.(20)

Given that the Police Boards of the independent forces must be credited with choosing the best available candidates, there is strong inferential evidence that small departments may not

develop or produce adequate chiefs as a matter of course, compelling civic authorities to look elsewhere for competent police executives.

Rather than examine the findings published by Ostrom, et al, one by one, to demonstrate that they are either erroneous or not relevant to the Canadian situation, it is more useful simply to describe the situation in Canada in 1990. For example, it has been alleged that:

1. **large departments are not close to the communities they serve.** In fact, the RCMP, with more than 16,000 officers, is highly regarded by the residents it serves in communities from coast to coast, yet it is probably the most frugal with respect to human resources "on the street" of any force in Canada. Furthermore, large forces have initiated team and zone policing, store-front police stations, community-based policing, community crime prevention, Block Watch and other programs to bring the police and the public closer together. Small forces are less able to provide these services and programs.

2. **regionalized forces cost more than independent municipal forces.** These assertions have been based on cost-per-capita comparisons, rather than cost-per-officer. However, 1989 data for Ontario show that, on average, the nine regionalized forces cost significantly less per capita ($103.36 on average) than the average for the 114 forces in the province ($134.81 on average). Departmental costs for the nine regionalized forces as a percentage of municipal expenditure (16.09% on average) were very close to the average cost for all Ontario forces (15.96%), indicating more service for similar proportions of the municipal budget.

   When the costs-per-officer of small GVRD and CRD departments are compared with even the largest municipal police forces, it is clear that smaller is not cheaper. For example, the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, with 5373 officers, costs less per officer than the Port Moody department of twenty-five officers ($77,230 vs. $78,240) and provides 52 percent more police per thousand residents (2.37 vs. 1.56); the Montreal Urban Community Police with 4457 officers costs less per officer than the Central Saanich Police with sixteen officers ($70,600 vs. $72,375) and provides 27 percent more police per thousand residents (2.59 vs. 2.04). (N.B. Police per 1000 residents is the most common measure of comparison. "One officer per X residents" also is used.)

3. **large departments have a greater percentage of staff in senior positions than do small departments.** This is not borne out by data for the eleven independent departments of the GVRD and CRD. Generally speaking, the larger the department, the smaller the percentage of sworn staff in senior positions.(21)

CITY	NO.SENIOR (a)	NO.CORP & CST (b)	% SPVR. (c)	RATIO SENIOR TO CORP & CST
Vancouver	125	873	10.2	1 to 7
Delta	17	103	11.3	1 to 6
Matsqui	11	66	16.6	1 to 6
New Westminster	17	82	20.7	1 to 4.8
West Vancouver	14	56	16.2	1 to 4
Port Moody	5	20	14.2	1 to 4
Central Saanich	4	13	17.3	1 to 3.3
Victoria	40	117	20.4	1 to 3
Saanich	35	83	23.8	1 to 2.4
Oak Bay	8	15	29.6	1 to 2
Esquimalt	12	14	38.7	1 to 1.2

a. Senior includes sergeants and higher ranks.
b. Corporals and constables.
c. Sworn officers as % of sworn and civilian staff.

4. Another measure of comparison is percentage of sworn staff of all ranks assigned to administrative and support tasks. The average percentages for Ontario in 1989 (see next Table) show rather clearly that the larger the agency the lower the percentage of staff in administrative positions.(23)

PERCENTAGE OF SENIOR STAFF IN ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS IN 114 ONTARIO POLICE FORCES, 1989

NUMBER OF STAFF (1)	NUMBER OF FORCES	PERCENT SENIOR (2) IN ADMINISTRATION
1 - 5	15	14.04
6 - 19	42	9.48
20 - 50	26	8.17
51 - 100	6	6.79
1183	1	7.14
7253	1	6.56

1. Includes sworn and civilian employees.
2. Includes sergeants and higher ranks.

Regardless of the validity, if any, that the Ostrom findings might once have had, it is clear that they have limited application in British Columbia in 1990, and cannot properly be used to argue against regionalization. Whether police operations should be reorganized is a decision for political leaders to make, but the decision should not be based on dated American research.(24)

NOTES: THE OSTROM THESIS

1. Elinor Ostrom usually has collaborated with other social scientists in studies of police effectiveness. Most often, she has published jointly with Roger B. Parks and Gordon P. Whitaker, but a few others in the field of public administration, notably Robert L. Bish, are sympathetic toward her viev s. Thus Bish, in 1987 in British Columbia, cites Ostrom and Dennis C. Smith (1976) as support for his uncritical assertion that "empirical studies of the basic police patrol function indicate that medium-sized cities tend to be more efficient than either large cities or very small cities." "Small," "mediumm" "large" and "efficient" are not defined; worse, implicit in these citations is the belief that conditions in the St. Louis metropolitan area in the early 1970's hold for all time and all places. Bish, Robert L.,

Local Government in British Columbia (Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1987), p. 74.

Most of the "charges" against small agencies that Ostrom, et al. "disproved" are not issues in British Columbia. These would include lack of cooperation among police departments, lack of availability of special services, lack of authority for "hot pursuit" across jurisdictional boundaries, adequate recruit training, duplication of services within a single municipality, and conflict due to overlapping jurisdiction. Some of the "proved" assertions are dubious at best; e.g., that small forces have smaller percentages of staff assigned to administrative tasks.

Some of the "empirical" findings are silly. For example, in June, 1988, Roger B. Parks presented a paper titled **"Metropolitan Structure and Systemic Performance: The Case of Police Service Delivery"** at a conference sponsored by the University of Victoria, titled "Policing in British Columbia: Thinking About the Future." The data were from the 1974 statistical study by Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker of 85 U.S. metropolitan areas. The results were commonplace and could be used to support simplistic arguments either for or against consolidation of services.

One result stands out:

> The coefficients for the clearance measures...reveal that auxiliary service structure exerts a stronger influence on clearances than does direct service structure
>
> ....Dominance in radio communications and in the supply of adult detention are positively related to clearance success.

The implication of this "empirical finding" is that a police force that has adult detention facilities will, by virtue of that fact, have a higher clearance rate than a department without such facilities. Assuming that the "finding" is reliable, a more logical explanation would be that departments with adult detention facilities most often will be full service departments with special squads to deal with different categories of crime.

2. Ostrom, Elinor and Dennis C. Smith, "On the Fate 'Lilliputs' in Metropolitan Policing," Public Administration Review (March/April 1976) 192-200.

3.Ibid., 193.

4.Henry S. Reuss, Revenue-Sharing: Crutch or Catalyst for State and Local Governments? (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 58. Cited in Ostrom and Smith, op. cit., 192.

5. Ibid.

6. John J. Callahan, "The Viability of the Small Police Department in Metropolitan Police Protection," presented to the American Society for Public Administration, New York, March 22, 1972, p. 1. Cited in Ostrom and Smith, loc. cit.

7.Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State-Local Relations in the Criminal Justice System (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). Cited in Ostrom and Smith, loc. cit.

8.Ostrom and Smith, op. cit., 194.

9. Ibid., 197.

10.Ostrom, Elinor, Roger B. Parks and Gordon P. Whitaker, Policing Metropolitan America (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 1-6, passim.

11. Ibid., pp. 15-26, passim.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 99. 29-37, passim.

14. Ibid., p. iv.

15. Ibid., p. 34.

16. Ostrom and Smith, op. cit., p. 193.

17. Ibid., p. 198.

18. Ibid., p. 195; Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks and Gordon P. Whitaker, "Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Police Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old Assertions," Public Administration Review, Volume 33, (September-October 1973),p.426.

19. William P. Browne, "Resource Needs and Attitudes Toward Financial Allocation: A Study of Suburban Police Chiefs," Public Administration Review, Volume 34, (July-August 1974) pp. 397-399; Ramsey Clarke, Crime in America: Observations on its Nature, Prevention and Control, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1970), p.398, cited in Ostrom and Smith, op.cit. p.195.

20. CHIEFS OF POLICE IN THE CRD AND GVRD

DEPT.	CHIEF	FROM	PREVIOUS CHIEF	FROM
CRD				
Victoria	Snowdon	Vancouver PD	Gregory	RCMP BCP
Saanich	Nixon	Saanich PD 2 Scottish Forces	Post	JI of BC Saanich PD Royal Dutch PD
Esquimalt	Marriott	Esquimalt PD Winnipeg PD	Burton	Esquimalt PD
Oak Bay	Anderson	RCMP	Moyes	Oak Bay PD
Central Saanich	Miles	RCMP	Gelling	C. Sannich PD RCMP
GVRD				
Vancouver	Stewart	Vancouver PD	Winterton	Vancouver PD
West Van.	Jenkins	Vancouver PD	Brolly	West Van. PD
New West-minster	Brown	Vancouver PD	Keary	New Westmin-minster PD
Delta	Wilson	RCMP	McLeod	Vancouver PD
Port Moody	Laughy	Vancouver Pd	McCabe	Port Moody PD Edmonton PD Ireland
Matsqui	Daniel	RCMP	Stewart	RCMP

21. British Columbia, Ministry of Solicitor General, Police Services Branch.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. The F.B.I. Uniform Crime Report Centre estimates that there were 25,000 U.S. police forces in 1989, down from an estimated 40,000 in 1967. Of these, only 12,300 reported UCR data to the F.B.I. Roger B. Parks assumed that the number of U.S. police forces was increasing. Parks, op. cit.,fn 3.

N.B. Some U.S. experts dispute the number of separate American police jurisdictions on the ground that the figure of 25,000 has been derived from an unsubstantiated figure of 40,000 proposed by Bruce Smith during the 1940's, and that no accurate count has been taken. Others point out that more than 1400 separate agencies were identified in Pennsylvania alone in 1981, and that 25,000 would not be an inordinate number for the entire U.S.A.

APPENDIX B

TRANSFER OF DUTIES OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA PROVINCIAL POLICE TO THE R.C.M.P.

The transfer of policing responsibility in British Columbia from the British Columbia Provincial Police to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police occurred on 15 August 1950, with amendments to the Police and Prisons Regulation Act (1948). This was the final act of the federal government to takeover provincial policing and the fulfilment of a strategy for the development of a national police service. Ironically, this was a takeover of the oldest territorial police force in Canada, founded in 1858, fifteen years before the creation of the RCMP. The amendments to the Act also provided for arrangements to be made (through the province) between various municipalities and the RCMP who would provide contract municipal policing. The motivation for the takeover was rooted in the social, political and economic milieus of the nation and the province. The primary and overriding motivator appeared to be financial, although it can be argued that the financial consideration was a cover for other issues.

The province paid $1,400 per RCMP member in 1950. The initial contract was for a period of six years, to be reviewed each year. By May 1957, a new contract was entered into and the price rose to $1,894. Under this second contract the province agreed to pay 40% of the average cost per member as of 31 March each year. The 1957 Agreement also saw all Provincial Agreements aligned with standard start and end dates and one unit contract price per member. This amount will have risen to 70% as of 1991. At the request of Commissioner Nicholson in May 1959, all contracts were to be for a longer term because the RCMP had found that short term agreements were not conducive to police efficiency.

THE PROVINCIAL POSITION

Regionalization of policing in British Columbia was first examined in 1932, by a committee that was studying the financial position of the province. It concluded that one police force could police thirty-nine existing provincial police jurisdictions at a considerable cost savings, and that the RCMP should take over these policing duties.(1) No change took place. In 1937, Gordon Wismer, the newly appointed Attorney General, contacted the federal Minister of Justice and again addressed the option of the RCMP taking over the responsibilities of the provincial police. A federal commission made similar recommendations in 1939. In 1942, the Attorney General again made inquiries but to no avail.

By 1946, political, economic and social conditions within Canada and British Columbia had changed sufficiently to permit, once more, a re-examination of the option of the RCMP assuming responsibility for the provincial policing of B.C. Financial considerations were a major issue in 1946, as they had always been. However, three other factors provided impetus. They were: (a) a concern for national security in the wake of a perceived resurgence of communism; (b) the rise of lawlessness amongst the Doukhobors; and (c) the pressure from outside forces to unionize the BCP.

The federal government had only a token presence in British Columbia prior to 1950. In the 1920's through to the 1950's communism and labour insurrection had caused the federal

government to reconsider its national security priorities. This concern was expressed by Gordon Wismer two days before the House rose on 28 March 1950, "you can assume in these days the question of national security is looming large on the horizon and we can do nothing better than fall in line with national policy."(2) The Winnipeg strike, the march on Ottawa which was halted in Regina, heightened security consciousness from the War years and the takeover of China by the communists in 1949, all contributed to the perceived need for a strong, united national police force; the RCMP was viewed as the best alternative.

Prior to 1950, special reserve Troops of RCMP had been strategically placed in Vancouver, Regina and Ottawa to deal with potential labour unrest or a threat to national security. With the takeover of the BCP in 1950, the Vancouver Troop was absorbed into the provincial force. It was felt that, particularly with the larger municipal contracts, sufficient men would be available to deal with any problem. On October 1, 1931, the BCP also had stationed an emergency ten man troop ('E' Division - Vancouver) at Oakalla Prison Farm for use against any insurrection or labour unrest. Ten horses were purchased and ten men were detailed for duty with the troop. The development of this troop was a direct result of the labour situation and threats of rioting being made by the leaders of the National Unemployed Workers' Association.

The second issue was the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors who, in the name of religion, and under the leadership of self styled and often corrupt leaders had defied the laws of Canada since the turn of the century. One of their leaders, Peter Lordly Verigin, had been killed in 1924, and his death caused the Freedomites to increase their lawlessness which would last for fifty years.

Between 1946 and 1950, when negotiations were under way between the province and the federal government, the Sons of Freedom burned and bombed private and public property resulting in millions of dollars damage. In the spring of 1950, a new wave of violence broke out which necessitated the temporary transfer of a troop of RCMP from the prairies to B.C. to reinforce the provincial police in the southern part of the province where the majority of the Freedomites lived. This outbreak delayed the signing of the contract while the federal government reviewed the position in which it might be placed.

The third issue was the perceived threat of the rise of unionism. It has been suggested that the increase in union interest and activity by the members of the BCP was the catalyst which ultimately led to its demise; however, this is debatable.(3) The uneasiness on the part of both the federal and provincial governments was rooted in the spread of world communism, which had just taken over in China and was moving into Korea.

On 9 November 1949, Fred Doherty, the president of the Vancouver Police Union met with thirty-seven members of the BCP in Burnaby. The Vancouver Police Union was, at that time, associated with the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC). Doherty's purpose was to form a provincial police association. Doherty had met previously with the Deputy Minister of Labour and the Attorney General who had reluctantly indicated that they would be prepared to meet with a delegation, through the Commissioner of the BCP. However, the Attorney General was serious about a "no strike clause."(4, 5)

Other factors leading up to the takeover are cited by Commissioner Harvison who, in 1950, was the senior RCMP officer in B.C. He states that the Attorney General thought changes were overdue. Through an amalgamation of the RCMP and the BCP, there could result a reduction in policing costs to the province, standardization of training and uniforms, implementation of a code of discipline, a reduction in the duplication of police posts, and possibly a reduction in the overall strength required to carry out policing in the province on behalf of the three levels of government concerned. The Attorney General also believed that by having the police work done

by the RCMP, under contract, any criticism of the police would be directed towards the federal government and the RCMP, and not the province.(6)

THE FEDERAL POSITION

The federal government seemed more anxious to conclude the contract than the province. The federal position seemed to favour policing of all the provinces by the RCMP because such an arrangement, it was believed, made for better policing; the Force could maintain adequate recruiting, personnel and training branches; it brought closer co-operation between different levels of law enforcement; and, it provided a uniform system of administration, discipline, communications and inspection.

As a final consideration, the federal government realized that it must accept some part of the cost and responsibility for law enforcement under changing conditions wherein criminals were becoming increasingly well-organized and mobile. Crime could no longer be considered a local problem or responsibility.(7) Specific to the Doukhobor problem in British Columbia, the federal government amended the Criminal Code which made nudity a criminal offence, punishable by three years in a federal penitentiary. Offenders were incarcerated at federal expense, thus relieving the provincial government of this cost which, during the 1930's, would have been considerable (had the Code not been amended) with the arrest of several hundred Doukhobors.

THE CHANGE OVER

In the spring of 1950, the Attorney General reported to Cabinet that "the policy of this Government is to safeguard the financial economy of the Province."(8) Financially, the Province was stable, having achieved a budget surplus for several years (1944-1950). The BCP, on the other hand, was reported to be in need of financial backing to keep abreast of the significant changes taking place in the Province.(9) The quarters were reported to be steadily deteriorating and would require approximately one million dollars to upgrade over a five year period (1949-1954).

This assessment differs from accounts from some members of the BCP who thought that the Attorney General knew well in advance that the RCMP would be the provincial police force, and therefore, allowed the buildings, vehicles and equipment to fall into a state of disrepair. The BCP had been the first police force in North America to use short wave radio for communication, which was vastly superior to the RCMP system in 1950. The BCP also had the most sophisticated Identification Services in Canada at the time of the takeover which enhanced the RCMP crime laboratory facilities. Many former BCP members believe that training given the BCP was also superior and was reflected in the number of BCP members who transferred to the RCMP and rose to senior positions.(10)

Wismer based his final decision on the cost of the two Forces. The cost of the RCMP to police the province was, without a doubt, the best price for the quality of police service in 1950, and would remain so as long as the federal government continued to pay a per cent of the total expense. The structure of the Force and the delivery of service was consistent with regional policing.

CONCLUSION

For the province of British Columbia, the takeover of the British Columbia Provincial Police by the RCMP on 15 August 1950, was a major policy initiative for the provincial government in terms of establishing a provincial police force with inter-provincial jurisdiction. There were major criticisms that B.C. manufacturers, who formerly supplied the BCP would lose revenue, that employment opportunities in secondary industries within the province would be lost to eastern pressures, and that "the nation's capital is a long way from B.C. and at times appears quite out of touch with [our] needs."(11) There is no doubt that no change would have taken place had it not been for the impetus of the provincial government and the leadership and foresight of the Attorney General.

From the federal point of view, the vision of a national police force and the concern for national security were strong motivators. Attempts had been made since the early 1930's, without success, to have the RCMP assume responsibility as the provincial police force. By 1950, the timing was right and all factors were justified on economic grounds from the provincial perspective, and on national security grounds from the federal perspective. The amendments to the Police and Prisons Regulation Act (1948), authorizing the province to enter into an agreement with the federal government remained in effect for twenty-four years until 1974, when it was replaced by the Police Act.

Wismer served two terms as Attorney General, first in 1936 and again in 1946. It was his strategy in his first term to have the RCMP takeover the duties of the British Columbia Provincial Police. Some believe that his intentions were secretive; he confided in some of his colleagues, federal and provincial, and certain members of the BCP.(12) Wismer believed that the RCMP could provide a regional style of policing which would be cost effective for the province and would provide efficiencies through economies of scale. These cost benefits to the province would last until the turn of the century.

REFERENCES

1. Talbot C.K., C.H.S Jayewarden and T.J. Juliani, Canada's Constables: The Historical Development of Policing In Canada, Crimecare Publications, 1985.
2. "Switch To RCMP Tied To Security," Vancouver Sun, 28 March 1950:2.
3. Interviews with Lew Dempsey, retired BCP; Fred Whiffin, retired BCP; Jimmy Williamson, retired BCP; Don Pye, retired BCP.
4. British Columbia Provincial Police Association, Bulletin #4, 29 November 1949.
5. William Stark, retired BCP.
6. Harvison, C.V., The Horsemen, McLelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1967.
7. British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General, Correspondence of the Honorable Gordon Wismer, Attorney General of British Columbia, 1936-1950.
8. Ibid.
9. Harvison, op. cit.
10. Interviews with Cecil Clark, retired BCP; Lew Dempsey, retired BCP; Fred Whiffin, retired BCP; Don Pye, retired BCP
11. Jack Gregory, retired BCP
12. Harvison, op. cit.

APPENDIX C

COMMUNICATION AND POLICE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Communication is the cornerstone of policing. Radio voice dispatch, computer-aided dispatch, electronic data processing, and Police Management Information Systems are but a few of the elements which make up police information technology. Over the past decade, there have been many experiments in the Canadian police community with computerized systems to enhance communications. A number of police departments are into their second or third generation of computer systems.

POLICE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

In 1983, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) created an Electronic Data Processing Committee to promote the development of standards for Police Management Information Systems (PMIS) in Canada. The Police Information Technology Centre (PITC) was created also to promote standards for operational police systems, and to operate in consultation with provincial governments and the Data Processing Committee. In 1985, the Justice Study Team report of the Nielsen Task Force on Program Review identified the need to develop police information technology as part of a national police service.

By 1985, the Electronic Data Processing Committee had identified a need for standards, information and advice, and training, as the most pressing issues relating to police automation. Without these standards, duplication of effort in developing PMIS would result, with long-term costs to police departments and the criminal justice system. Specifically, these costs would be incurred from expenses of retroactive design and a loss of efficiency resulting from the unavailability of standard information.

In an attempt to organize PMIS, provincial ministries or police commissions responsible for law enforcement were designated as the provincial focal points for co-ordination and development. In British Columbia, the Police Commission was assigned this role.

Despite the accomplishments of the CACP - Electronic Data Processing Committee and other federal and provincial organizations, there is a lack of co-ordination of efforts at the national and provincial levels to develop standards for operational applications of Police Management Information Systems.

British Columbia is no exception. There is a lack of co-ordination in PMIS among the police community. There are no provincial or regional strategies, no direction and no co-ordination of effort, resulting in cost overruns, duplication and voids.

There are three PMIS data bases employed in B.C. by the police community:

1. The Police Information Retrieval System (PIRS) is operated by the RCMP in conjunction with the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC). PIRS is also used by seven of the 12 independent municipal police departments - Nelson, Port Moody, Matsqui, Delta, New Westminster, West Vancouver and Central Saanich.

2. Search Entry And Retrieval Crime History (SEARCH) is operated by the four core Capital Regional District (CRD) municipal police departments - Victoria, Oak Bay, Esquimalt and Saanich.

3. The Planning and Research Corporation (PRC) System is operated by the Vancouver Police department.

The RCMP is now integrating PIRS with CPIC and developing a new system called Computer Integrated Information Dispatch Systems (CIIDS) which will include an automated dispatch system, among other features. CIIDS is currently being tested. Full implementation is approximately two years away.

PIRS is not without its problems. There are intermittent downtimes. Address and phone queries are slow, some up to ten minutes. This is unacceptable. Also, PIRS will not allow query flexibility. Seventy percent of PIRS traffic is generated from B.C., yet it has only one database 2000 miles away.

SEARCH is an automated records management system, based mainly on prompts. The SEARCH database is reaching its capacity and the CRD municipal departments are considering alternatives that would expand SEARCH or change to another system. Saanich is considering PIRS, as are Oak Bay and Esquimalt. Victoria supports SEARCH.

The Vancouver Police Department's system software was purchased from the Ottawa Police Department. It is a proprietary system which operates with Computer Assisted Dispatch (CAD). This is an excellent dispatch system using Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) and all the latest CAD features, but incompatible with SEARCH or PIRS. Within the CRD, the Saanich Police Department uses the SEARCH data base to download data into their Landtrak graphic information system which applies the crime statistics to the map data. Crime analysis is dramatically enhanced by the graphic capability to identify, assemble and disseminate information concerning crime patterns and trends. Although only used by Saanich, the Landtrak mapping software has the capacity to map the CRD or the GVRD.

The Victoria Police Department is examining the option of building a separate graphic information system for mapping, based on the ATLAS program used by the provincial government. The ATLAS mapping system has crime analysis capabilities similar to Landtrak.

Two mapping systems in the CRD would worsen existing duplications and inefficiencies in PMIS. The only consideration should be for one common graphic information system for mapping the CRD and one for the GVRD, both operating on a single standard, integrated, provincial data base.

One of the long-term goals of PMIS is to operate on a paperless system. To achieve this level of sophistication, all police departments must use common data on a common system under coordinated direction. The strategy for such a standardized system must be established beforehand to allow integration, because of the large cost and the time involved. It is not enough in policing to integrate within a department; police must be able to communicate within a network with all departments. Such a system would require CAD, mapping, MDTS, statistical analysis, financial management, manpower scheduling and purchasing among other features.

For police information to be of maximum value, it must be shared, particularly in the CRD, the GVRD and the Lower Mainland. With no federal PMIS strategies and, more importantly, no provincial PMIS strategies and no leadership or direction, further inefficiency and cost overruns will result. Over the next decade, it is estimated that the cost of hardware could be reduced by approximately 30 percent per year while the capacity for PMIS to grow will increase

by an equal rate. This pricing and demand will bring all hardware and software within financial reach of most departments. If compatibility and integration are not standardized and adopted, police departments will dictate their own standards and further fragment computer applications. If a single department custom builds a turn key system it will be built to specifications unique to that department.

The most urgent requirement is to establish leadership in Police Management Information Systems. The following priorities should be established:

1. Identify a single centre of responsibility for PMIS in B.C.
2. Establish a PMIS strategic plan.
3. Establish standards in PMIS.
4. Specify the role of the province in PMIS.
5. Establish links between resource centres, the province and the police community.
6. Identify resources available to achieve integrated PMIS.

Standards will not be developed without strong command, control and leadership, a vision of Police Management Information Systems in B.C., strategic planning and a will to achieve.

The following standards should be established:

- a one terminal solution
- a common data dictionary
- a common regional data base which in turn will contribute to and query data from neighbouring jurisdictions
- an ability to measure resource input, activities and results in all areas of police service delivery to help develop performance indicators
- an ability to identify information needs
- an ability to identify training requirements
- a standard protocol for all PMIS--federal, provincial and municipal--in all jurisdictions.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

The status of radio communication in the CRD and GVRD is, in some respects, as diverse as the PMIS. This situation has resulted from a lack of unified direction and standards. Two incidents involving multi-jurisdictional pursuits have resulted in some consolidation of radio communication systems in both regions.

In the CRD, a Victoria police officer was pursuing a vehicle which had travelled into the Colwood RCMP jurisdiction. The Victoria police officer was unable to communicate directly with the RCMP member who was operating a police vehicle directly behind the Victoria vehicle. In the GVRD, a Vancouver police officer, also in pursuit, travelled through Burnaby RCMP and Delta municipal police jurisdictions. Communication could be maintained only by land line, not radio. Only the MDT in the Vancouver vehicle remained operational for the entire length of the pursuit. These and other incidents prompted the necessary liaison to improve communications between the RCMP and the neighbouring municipal police jurisdictions.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Communications between RCMP jurisdictions is maintained through a series of repeater sites and radio channels. As with PMIS, the RCMP provides a regional communications net for the entire province. In the GVRD and CRD, the RCMP is capable of electronically monitoring neighbouring municipal departments. Over and above this electronic capability, the Colwood detachment has requested permission to install eight separate radio sets in the Colwood vehicles to permit direct voice communications over the Victoria Police Department frequency. In the GVRD, the RCMP rent approximately 25 of Vancouver's MDT's for use in vehicles operated by the five independent municipal RCMP detachments and the freeway patrol vehicles.

Capital Regional District

In the CRD, Victoria, Oak Bay and Esquimalt police departments share the same radio frequency (two channels - one local and one repeater). This licence is owned by Victoria which recovers costs from the other two departments. These three departments are able to monitor the Colwood RCMP. Victoria has installed a touch-tone, key-activated system which allows a municipal police officer in a car (Victoria, Oak Bay or Esquimalt) to communicate directly with an RCMP member in a vehicle, in the event of an emergency. Some of the police vehicles (Dog, Chief Constable) also have radios which can scan other frequencies such as Saanich and Central Saanich.

Each of these three departments has its own municipal capabilities. Oak Bay police department monitors Oak Bay Fire Department and Oak Bay Public Works. Oak Bay does not have a scan capability.

Esquimalt police department does not monitor Public Works, but does monitor the Greater Victoria Fire frequency and has voice communications ability. All fire calls in Esquimalt are handled on the police radio net. This is due to the dual (public safety) role of Esquimalt police/fire department.

Saanich police department has separate police radio frequencies from Victoria. Saanich has the capability to change channels to a Victoria frequency, but in doing so, the Saanich unit would lose contact with Saanich dispatcher. Saanich can monitor the RCMP and communicate car-to-car in an emergency. Recently, Central Saanich was licensed to operate on their own frequency. As a result of this change, Saanich police department cannot monitor Central Saanich police department, although Saanich is working towards this goal. Central Saanich received a licence to operate their own frequency, early in April of this year. Through a Motorola System MCX-1000, Central Saanich radios can scan up to twelve programable frequencies. The police frequency is a priority; other frequencies programmed include Saanich police, Victoria/Oak Bay/Esquimalt police, Central Saanich fire departments, Central Saanich Public Works, and the Sidney RCMP.

Greater Vancouver Regional District

Radio communication in the GVRD is more diverse than the CRD because there are more police jurisdictions. Like the CRD, necessity has prompted most, but not all, departments to establish a voice communication protocol with other departments.

Delta police department operates on their own frequencies on a dual system. One is an 800 MHz trunk system transmitting from Seymour Mountain. This system is shared with other commercial, non-police users. The second system is the original, conventional communication system located in the municipality. Both systems are operating on Motorola hardware. Because the trunk system is used by other, non-police agencies, each with their own priorities, response is

not as fast as is required for the Delta police department. In addition, the trunk system does not provide adequate coverage to dead areas. The conventional system does fill this void.

Delta does not have voice communication with Surrey RCMP or Vancouver. Delta can monitor voice communication of the south RCMP cars, but not the south RCMP dispatcher (Surrey RCMP communication system is divided into north and south). Communication with Surrey RCMP and RCMP freeway patrol Unit "A" is achieved through a telephone patch. Delta is considering the purchase of a dedicated trunk system for police, fire and engineering.

Matsqui operates two channels on their own frequencies. It has voice communication with the RCMP on an emergency tactical channel. Matsqui does not share radio communication with the Abbotsford/Matsqui fire departments or Public Works, and cannot communicate with the Vancouver police department. Matsqui has four portable radios operating on separate frequencies for emergency use. Two of the channels will allow communication with the B.C. Police Academy and the Matsqui fire department.

The Port Moody police department operates on its own frequencies. Port Moody can monitor and communicate (car to car and base to base) with Coquitlam RCMP but not Burnaby. The current location of the radio repeater tower does not allow complete communication, due to the terrain. These dead spots are a source of concern and a new site is being sought. Port Moody does not have voice communication with the Vancouver police department. The technology is available; but the connection has not been made.

The Vancouver police department operates on its own frequencies. Vancouver uses a liaison communication system and has voice communication capability with West Vancouver, Burnaby and Richmond. The RCMP has access to one frequency and uses Vancouver's mobile data terminals (MDTs) in some RCMP vehicles. The Vancouver police department also has one fire channel for use when communication is required with the Vancouver fire department. Vancouver does not have voice communication capability with Delta police.

New Westminster operates on its own system. As part of the liaison communications, New Westminster has voice communications with neighbouring police jurisdictions except Delta. RCMP liaison communications only allows voice communications between cars, not dispatchers. The New Westminster police has voice communications with the municipality, and has a GVRD emergency network for emergencies. To resolve the communication problem with the Delta police department, New Westminster would like Delta to install one of Delta's radios in the New Westminster communications centre.

West Vancouver police operates on its own frequencies. Through liaison communications, West Vancouver has voice communications (car-to-car only) with Squamish and North Vancouver RCMP and the Vancouver police department. Some cars (for example, dog) can scan other radio frequencies. West Vancouver police does not have voice communications with the fire department. It can monitor Public Works.

SUMMARY

Priorities for radio communications should be standardized. Leadership is required to achieve this goal through unity of command and control. Police Service Branch should set policy for these vital services.

APPENDIX D

9-1-1 EMERGENCY NUMBER

The 9-1-1 emergency number for police, fire and ambulance services was originally considered for implementation as a provincial initiative in the early 1980's, by the Ministry of Universities, Science and Communications. The proposal was not approved by Cabinet at that time. The UBCM passed a resolution encouraging the Government to re-consider and provide financial support to establish a 9-1-1 Emergency Response System throughout the Province.

The provincial government's response to the UBCM proposal was a policy statement which supported the proposal in principle. "Densely populated areas, nearly all of which are within the municipal jurisdictions, have the greatest need for 9-1-1 Emergency Response Systems. The province supports the use of well designed and implemented 9-1-1 Emergency Response Systems in these municipal jurisdictions. The province does not, however, have the resources to provide funding assistance or a province-wide 9-1-1 system."

Local municipalities in the CRD, GVRD and other regional districts developed separate 9-1-1 Emergency Response Systems with the assistance of BC Tel. Currently, the enhanced E9-1-1 caller identification display system is operating in the Capital Regional District (CRD), the Central Okanagan Regional District (CORD), the South Okanagan Regional District (SORD) and the North Okanagan Regional District (NORD). As of June 17, 1990, the GVRD will be operating with the enhanced E9-1-1 system west of 276th Street (including all of the 856 exchange).

The configuration of 9-1-1 options available are determined by the number of answering points and dispatch points. The most common options are: (1) decentralized answering and decentralized dispatch; (2) centralized answering and decentralized dispatch and, (3) centralized answering and centralized dispatch. Decentralized answering and dispatch require more hardware and personnel than do centralized. However, in the event that all equipment and personnel are situated in one physical location (centralized answering and dispatch), the risk of having a complete system failure caused by major disaster, for example, is significantly increased.

The type of hardware is almost identical for centralized and decentralized systems. The physical amount of hardware at answering points would be less for a decentralized system. Economies of scale would be achieved mainly through fewer personnel and less hardware. Additional savings could be achieved by using existing networks or by combining new networks as they are installed.

The best cost scenario is to employ one large provincial communication system for all emergency services (PEP, police, fire, ambulance). Such a communications 'superhighway' to serve B.C. has already been proposed by the BC Tel Group. This would provide an enhanced 9-1-1 system complemented by additional high technology audio visual communication systems for the entire province at an equitable rate. The next best scenario is to operate with a primary centralized answering point (E9-1-1 for police, fire and ambulance) and decentralized secondary dispatch points. This would minimize personnel and maximize manpower planning and flexibility.

A preliminary study conducted by BC Tel determined that most calls in B.C. were for police services. Accordingly, the 9-1-1 equipment was installed in the respective police buildings where 24-hour answer/dispatch service could be provided in conjunction with other services such

as complaint taking, dispatch and reception work. Calls for ambulance and fire are received at the 9-1-1 centres and immediately re-routed to the respective dispatcher, by dedicated telephone lines.

The CRD determined that decentralized answering and decentralized dispatch better met the collective needs of the respective municipalities because no one municipality could answer calls and dispatch for another. In the case of the GVRD, the centralized answering and decentralized dispatch was determined to be the best method. In the GVRD, one municipality could answer all calls and relay to the various dispatch points. By its very nature, the decentralized answering point and decentralized dispatch point method of 9-1-1 dispatch (selected by the CRD) is the most costly and least efficient because it allows for duplication of communication systems at seven primary answering points. There are operators and equipment in the five municipal police departments, and the RCMP detachment in Colwood which dispatches for Ganges, Pender, Sidney, Sooke, and Colwood. (The military police at CFB Esquimalt.)

A "Force Management Package" was designed to electronically monitor the 9-1-1 System in the CRD however it is not operational. Even without it, there are clear indications of inefficiencies with staffing levels and systems maintenance. Average calls are significantly reduced during off-hours, yet total staff allocations remain constant throughout the CRD. This decentralized method of staffing all centres makes flexibility and accompanying economies of scale virtually impossible. Decentralization also causes increased maintenance on all systems due to the need to constantly update routing codes. On the positive side, in the event of a disaster at any one of the primary answering points, the other answering points could respond to their own calls but not the calls of the disabled jurisdiction.

The GVRD's centralized/decentralized system has one answering point and 27 dispatch points. All calls are answered at the primary answering point at 312 Main Street, Vancouver police department, then transferred to the various dispatch points throughout the GVRD. Fewer personnel are employed and manpower planning at the one primary answering point is enhanced. In the event of a disaster at 312 Main Street, a switch can re-direct calls to the respective secondary dispatch points which would then answer their own calls.

SUMMARY

There is a need for a common police communications system which would encompass a province-wide 9-1-1 Emergency Response System to link the various emergency response agencies. The technology to accomplish this objective is available and the present E9-1-1 system has the capacity. These needs extend beyond police, fire and ambulance to agencies which would be required in the event of a provincial emergency.

It is recommended that:

1. centralized E9-1-1 primary answering and decentralized dispatch be employed for all regions;
2. central staffing be implemented to enhance flexibility and full resource allocation;
3. a province-wide 9-1-1 communication 'superhighway' be created; 4. a province-wide police communication system be developed that would accommodate all provincial emergency programs.

APPENDIX E

CRD POLICE SERVICES: A PROPOSED MODEL

GREATER VICTORIA REGIONAL

POLICE SERVICES:

A PROPOSED MODEL

Presented by the Victoria Area Chiefs of Police:

Chief W. Snowdon;
Chief J. Post;
Chief W. Moyes;
Chief P. Marriott;
Chief R. Miles; and

Deputy Chief E. Avison (Project Coordinator)

June, 1985

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
Part I.	Introduction	1
Part II.	Consolidation	7
Part III.	Model	12
	1. Bureau of Operations	12
	(a) Patrol Division	12
	(b) Detective Division	14
	(c) Traffic Division	16
	2. Bureau of Support Services	17
	(a) Administrative Services Division	18
	(b) Staffing and Personnel Development Division	19
	(c) Community Services Division	20
Part IV.	Cost Implications	23
	1. Employee Salaries	23
	2. Motor Equipment Operation	25
	3. Police Building	26
Part V.	Conclusion	28

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Today's police forces have to be concerned as much with people management, high-tech equipment and budgets as they are with policing. Cost effectiveness, efficiency and productivity improvement have become the major issues in a climate of tight budgets and hiring cutbacks.

In 1960 the criminal justice system cost Canadians about $300 million. Today, with inflation, increased demands on the police, the courts and the correctional services, and high technology, the tab is an estimated $4 billion--plus. Policing alone accounts for more than 50%. In the two decades from 1960 to 1980, police costs per capita climbed 807%, outpacing the 630% rise in Canada's gross national product.

In this high-cost environment, no longer can the Chiefs of Police who run Canada's 400 departments concern themselves only with how their forces serve and protect. They have to be the linchpins in a management team, as concerned with budgets and benefits as they are with deployment of manpower and technology.

The biggest bill is for salaries for the 53,000 officers and 15,000 civilian employees, at 85%-90% of the departments' budgets. In 1966 a First Class Constable in Canada averaged just over $6,000 per year. By 1984 that had climbed to $34,000, an increase of approximately 450%. Wages for Canadians in general rose from $4,400 in 1966 to $21,000 last year, or about 375%.

Civilian employee salaries are generally lower. As a result, more civilians are being hired by police departments, in an effort to reduce or to keep costs in line, the idea being that paying a sworn, highly trained officer $34,000 a year to act as a dispatcher, court and file clerk is not viewed as cost effective. However, there are problems with this approach. For one thing, while high level civilian administrators are now appearing in some forces, career paths may be severely limited for most. Then, too, police associations are likely to demand pay parity with the officers they have replaced.

Police officers are no longer beat pounders and door rattlers. The best of the police officers are highly trained and usually highly motivated professionals, deeply concerned about such things as personal and career development and advancement, and the quality of service to their communities. They command (and demand) a salary that reflects the skills employed, the shift work, and the risks.

Equipment costs are also causing budget increases. Police officers are, in the interests of improved productivity and effectiveness, able to access at a local and national level multi-million dollar computerized information systems, communications networks, criminal investigation laboratories, plus thousands of dollars in personal accouterments. Further cost increases can be expected as these technologies improve.

Much of the cost increase results from changes in the police officer's job. Crime is becoming more sophisticated and increasingly violent. Police have had to develop more effective methods of dealing with the computer criminal and the thug or political terrorist. More intelligent, purposeful, and often more heavily armed, the criminal has

added a new phrase to the police lexicon of the 1980s: street survival.

These are but a few of the perplexing and complex problems confronting police administrators today, and are introduced in an attempt to generate the notion that given our current economic situation in the Greater Victoria area, the subject of cost efficiency becomes a critical factor in assessing the future style, quality and delivery of policing services. In May 1985 the Police Boards of Victoria, Saanich, Oak Bay and Central Saanich determined that they would re-examine the amalgamation of their police forces under one administration. Accordingly, a committee comprised of senior administrative staff was tasked with the project. The committee, in turn, invited the participation of the Victoria area Chiefs and this report reflects their input.

Although raised on a number of occasions during the past 30 years, the subject of consolidation, or more popularly expressed as amalgamation, has been the subject of a number of reports but, interestingly enough, never structurally conceptualized on paper. The committee therefore posed the question to the Chiefs: "If the forces were to be amalgamated under one administration, what would the model look like, and, in general, what could we identify as the changes in the costs and service levels to the community?" To address this question, we must first apply some basic organizational theory to our existing police services and delivery thereof.

The behavior of an organization, like that of advanced biological organisms, is goal-directed, rather than purely reflexive or random. Organizations usually have one or more formal, explicit goals. As in policing, there may also be informal, implicit goals that can be inferred from organizational decisions and actions. An organization's

central goals and the strategy chosen to attain them are the result of a political decision process. Organization members with substantial influence, such as high level executives and administrators, frequently disagree about goals and priorities. Such conflicts are resolved through a process of persuasion, bargaining, coalition formation, and power plays.

One central goal of all organizations, whether explicit or implicit, is survival. If an organization achieves the original objectives for which it was created, or if these become incompatible with survival, new objectives and strategies for achieving them must be found to replace them. Flowing from this, and having close association with this theme, is "organizational effectiveness", one of the most frequently referenced, yet least understood, concepts in organization theory. Early management theorists defined effectiveness as the meeting or surpassing of organizational goals: "When a specific desired end is attained, the action is viewed as 'effective'". This perspective has been labelled the goal model approach to the study of organizational effectiveness, since it is a view of organizations as principally concerned with the attainment of certain end "products" or goals.

More recently, however, a second view of organizational effectiveness has emerged. This is an approach to organizations as social systems operating in environments of scarce or diminishing resources. Incorporating an open-systems viewpoint, the so-called system resource model approach defines effectiveness as the degree to which an organization is successful in acquiring and utilizing scarce and valued resources. Thus, considering the whole of an organization and not just its ends, effectiveness relates to the nature of the interaction between

an organization and its surrounding environment.

In the interests of clarity, it is perhaps timely to establish a distinction between organizational effectiveness and organizational efficiency. The usefulness of this distinction can perhaps be best appreciated by noting that virtually all organizations strive to achieve their goals within the constraints of imposed limited resources. Consequently, the concept of efficiency, the ratio of an organization's outputs to its inputs, must be introduced. An organization is judged efficient if, when compared to similar organizations, its outputs (or benefits received) are relatively high in comparison to its inputs (or costs). Thus, if two companies making the same product finish the fiscal year with equal production levels but one attained the level with fewer invested resources than the other, that company (other things being equal) would be described as being more efficient. It achieved the same level of output with fewer inputs.

The important point to note is that while effectiveness and efficiency are closely related, they are not interchangeable. That is to say, organizations such as the police departments of Victoria, Saanich, Oak Bay and Central Saanich, could easily be judged effective without being efficient, just as they could be judged efficient without being effective. Neither condition is a necessary prerequisite for the other. If we apply this premise to the four departments identified, it is fair to say that although they are notably effective in providing police services to the community, they do not, at times, necessarily enjoy the same marked reputation for being efficient.

Our ability to adjust and react quickly to environmental and economic change and to maintain an efficient ratio of outputs to inputs

depends, in large part, on our "organizational structure". The structure of an organization is the pattern of prescribed roles and role relationships, the allocation of activities to separate sub-units, the distribution of authority among administrative positions, and the formal communication network. In effect, structure is the formal plan for achieving an efficient division of labor and effective coordination of members' activities.

The structural features of our police organizations, for the most part, are systematic and intentional in design, rather than a random pattern. As managers, we endeavor to organize in a way that will facilitate the attainment of organizational goals. Since there are a vast number of structural variations possible, finding one that will be appropriate for the needs of the Victoria area and its citizens is a complex problem. We must, therefore, be cautious of embarking on programs of planned change without adequate analysis. To do so is to gamble with their organizational resources, while jeopardizing their long-run success.

PART II

CONSOLIDATION

The "Task Force Report: The Police", written in 1967 for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, noted:

> Thus far, this chapter has considered methods of ameliorating the effects of decentralized local police administration through the coordination or consolidation of staff, auxiliary, and certain field functions. It has not considered coordination or consolidation in relation to basic patrol services; yet, if these services are not considered, it must be on the assumption that every police agency, regardless of size, is capable of providing them effectively if staff, auxiliary, and certain field services are available on a coordinated or consolidated basis. ("Task Force Report: The Police", 1967, p. 98)

The task force then stated its preference for partial or complete consolidation, rather than the mixed coordinative devices described earlier in the study:

> Partial or complete consolidation of police services reduces conflicts over jurisdiction; with consolidation there are fewer jurisdictions with which to contend. The more compelling reason for consolidation is the elimination of the law enforcement powers or jurisdictions that do not provide quality law enforcement because of administrative deficiencies or financial inadequacies. ("Task Force Report: The Police", 1967, p. 99)

The same report further indicated that:

> Because of some overlapping jurisdiction, the residents of areas served by the metropolitan department or the small municipal agencies, as a matter of local choice, are paying more for police protection than is necessary. As has been noted, however, jurisdictional problems are minimized by the unquestioned authority of the metropolitan department. As a practical matter, the chief of the metropolitan department feels that the independent departments served a useful purpose in the period following the reorganization before the metropolitan department could adequately cover the suburban and rural areas. This situation has now been remedied through the addition of personnel and an increase in patrol coverage. ("Task Force Report: The Police", 1967, p. 102)

Even though the authors of the report did not provide substantive proof to the assertions, they went on to state that:

> Consolidation can frequently upgrade police service and lower its cost. This is often the case when counties consolidate municipal and county police agencies to create a single countrywide police force. Because it is larger, the consolidated agency usually has superior resources. Because it eliminates much duplication, it is usually less expensive--citizens get more for their money. ("National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals", 1973, p. 109)

In describing the consolidation of the City of Lexington and Fayette County, Kentucky, the National Advisory Commission reported:

> Combining police responsibilities under one agency permitted the consolidation of such functions as communications, records and identification, investigation, and traffic and patrol. The result has been greater overall efficiency. ("National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals", 1973, p. 113)

There is, however, no citation of any evidence to support this assertion about "greater overall efficiency".

The report continues by discussing the Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida, consolidation:

> The Jacksonville consolidation demonstrated that although consolidation may be more efficient, it is not necessarily more economical. Consolidation may require more personnel to bring all areas up to the level of desired service; it may involve salary increases to equalize the salaries of personnel involved in the merger; and it may cost more to equip and house the larger staff. Consolidation is much less likely to save money than to improve effectiveness. ("National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals", 1973, p. 113)

The notion that four of the five Victoria area police forces be consolidated under one administration has, from an administrative and operational point of view, considerable merit. There are a number of historically applied assumptions which tend to support this contention, economic considerations notwithstanding:

(1) Small departments do not provide a full range of services to their respective communities;

(2) Small departments "waste" personnel by creating (through necessity) the need for separate administrations for each department;

(3) Small departments predominate in patrol service delivery, with minimal, if any, specialization; and

(4) Small departments are less effective than larger departments in service delivery.

Discussion of police agency size naturally centers around the concept of a "full service" police department and a maximized level of service to the participating communities. Clearly, the style or level of policing would have to be attuned to the needs and expectations of the

people receiving the service. Of course, to accomplish this, each municipality would have to see their policing priorities in the same light. It is inconceivable that the residents of Saanich would accept a standard of service less than they have heretofor enjoyed.

The two small police departments, although very community relations conscious, with a strong operational emphasis on proactive policing, are generally viewed as inadequate because they lack the financial resources to augment existing services with such things as scenes of crime identification technologists, computerized records and administrative systems, and state of the art communications, to name but a few. This presumption of inadequacy is perhaps somewhat unfair, because the inability of the small departments to augment existing services with those of a more specialized nature should not be interpreted as indicating an inability to access them when required or when more financially palatable to them. These, and other, specialized services are available to them now and are provided upon request by the R.C.M.P., Victoria, or Saanich Police Departments.

It also bears noting that a high level of administrative and operational cooperation and adaptability exists between the five police agencies in the Greater Victoria area. When specific problems or needs are identified that impact any or all of the five jurisdictions, there is always a rapid and cooperative pooling of available resources in targetting or responding to given problems.

The Victoria area Chiefs, although cognizant of the practicalities associated with consolidation, are also very conscious of the financial implications. Alternatively, they have, through careful analysis, identified a number of specialized police services for

regionalization. The following have been established as regionally accessible specialized police support services:

(1) Underwater Search and Recovery;

(2) Emergency Response Tactical Service;

(3) Computerized Index System (S.E.A.R.C.H.); and

(4) Hypnotic Investigative Services.

The first regional canine unit will become an operational reality on July 1, 1985, while plans for a regional identification services facility are in their final stages. The cost implications associated with these services are discussed in a separate report.

Despite the many and varied logistical problems associated with consolidating four of Victoria's five police forces, the area Chiefs have, apart from the foregoing observations, confined their appraisal to the component parts of the question: model and cost. Let us now consider the two.

PART III

MODEL

Conceptually, the consolidated force would bear the name Greater Victoria Regional Police Services. Geographically, it would include all the present land mass within the municipal boundaries of the Municipalities of Saanich, Oak Bay and Central Saanich, and the City of Victoria (see Map 1, below). Organizationally, the model, under the command of a Chief Constable, would consist of two Bureaus, the Bureau of Operations and the Bureau of Support Services, each having a Deputy Chief Constable at its executive helm (see diagram accompanying, but separate to, this report).

1. Bureau of Operations

Contained within this Bureau's operational framework are all those services having response/reactive/investigative roles, i.e., Patrol Division, Detective Division, and Traffic Division.

(a) Patrol Division:

This Division would be responsible for the provision of general patrol and other special support services in a newly-defined geographical area encompassing some 73.6 miles. Due to the size and breadth of its operational and administrative responsibilities, a Superintendent would be required to provide executive direction. In support of, and directly accountable to, him would be two Inspectors, each assigned a separate command

VICTORIA
171
180
NORTH SAANICH, DM
SIDNEY, T.
170
CENTRAL SAANICH, DM
160.02
160.01
133
132
CAPITAL, SUBD. B, SRD Pt
155 Pt
SAANICH, DM
081–014,
100–104,
110 and 111,
120–131,
150–153
151.01
151.02
152
SAANICH, DM
VICTORIA, C
OAK BAY, DM
155 Pt
SUBD. B, SRD Pt
154
Juan De Fuca Strait
LEGEND–LÉGENDE
SCALE 1:150,000 ÉCHELLE

responsibility within two patrol districts, i.e., Patrol District 1--North, and Patrol District 2--South (see Map 2, below).

Structurally, the Division would have as its primary patrol component eight platoons. A ninth, "Special Services" platoon would augment patrol services and would be directly accountable to the Superintendent. Its operational mandate would be to target specific problems in the Greater Victoria area.

The other operational support services provided by this Division would be: Canine Unit, Emergency Response Tactical Team, Underwater Search and Recovery Unit, Marine Support Unit, and Reserve Police Services.

The Division would require police and civilian staff as follows:

Police:	Superintendent	1
	Inspector	2
	Staff Sergeant	8
	Sergeant	9
	Corporal	8
	Constable	146
		174
Civilian:	Clerk Stenographer	3
	Custodian (Cells)	5
	Police Service Reps.	32
		40
Total Police and Civilian		214

(b) Detective Division:

This Division would comprise four main investigative sections, i.e., Youth Services Section, General Investigation Section, Persons Section, and Fraud Section. Identification


NORTH DIST.
SOUTH DIST
VICTORIA
133 Pt
132 Pt
155 Pt
128
131
121.02
121.03
121.01
129.02
129.01
150
151.01 Pt
151.02 Pt
152 Pt
153
154 Pt
127
126
125
124
122
120
104
123.02
123.01
103
102
101
100
111.02
111.01
110
013
014
012
011
010
009
004
005
006
003.02
003.01
002
001
Esquimalt Harbour
Royal Roads
Cordova Bay
Haro Strait
Juan De Fuca Strait
Gosse Island
SCALE 1:75,000 ÉCHELLE
Miles
Kilometres

Services, although a field level technical support unit to the criminal investigator, also provides support to other police personnel. It would remain under the direction of the Detective Inspector.

Also an integral part of investigative services are the N.C.I.S. and J.F.O. units. Because of a joint partnership and directional arrangement with the R.C.M.P., they would remain quartered elsewhere.

The combined personnel requirements for this Division are as follows:

Police:	Inspector	2
	Staff Sergeant	4
	Sergeant	31
	Detective Constable	20
	Constable	2
		59
Civilian:	Clerk Stenographer	4
	Photo Technician	1
		5
Total Police and Civilian		64

(c) Traffic Division

Typically traffic enforcement and control oriented, this Division would be tasked with administering to all matters associated with traffic control and flow patterns, and random and selective enforcement. Other services provided by this Division would be accident investigation (general) and hit and run accident investigation. Personnel would also be involved in the design and implementation of accident prevention strategies. In addition, the Division would provide valuable assistance and

information in the assessment and re-design of streets and intersections.

The number of personnel required to service this Division is:

Police:	Inspector	1
	Staff Sergeant	1
	Sergeant	2
	Constable	22
		26
Civilian:	Clerk Stenographer	1
Total Police and Civilian		27

2. Bureau of Support Services

Currently, the four police Departments provide administrative support services to their staff, the courts and other components of the criminal justice system. All must work within the confines of their respective economic limitations, despite having to re-assume many of the services, particularly court services, heretofore provided and funded by the province. Viewed in a broad jurisdictional context, the services are fragmented and, although reasonably effective in satisfying the operational/informational needs of police personnel, yield only token consideration to their personal and professional needs. In addition, the services are expensively repetitious and lack uniformity.

Given the operational and administrative needs and expectations of police personnel, coupled with a constantly changing work environment, the need to refine existing systems (be they manual or

automated), while at the same time ensuring the technical and professional competency of personnel, is an awesome commitment. It is, however, suggested that if police services are to keep abreast of the times, there must be a collective assembly of effort and financial resources to ensure that technological alternatives are sought and applied where necessary.

A consolidation of support services would, for the purpose of this model, be under the executive direction of a Deputy Chief Constable. Conceptually, it would contain three major Divisions, i.e., Administrative Services Division, Staffing and Personnel Development Division, and Community Services Division.

(a) Administrative Services Division:

The services provided by this Division are considered predominantly civilian in nature and therefore would require a civilian "Systems Manager" or "Director of Finance and Administrative Systems", whichever title is considered most suitable. The services would include: research and financial management, police records, computer services, court services, crime analysis, firearms control and registration, equipment supplies and services, vehicle services, central purchasing, and communications.

The staffing requirements of this Division are as follows:

Police:	Staff Sergeant	1
	Sergeant	1
	Corporal	5
	Constable	1
		8

Civilian:	Systems Manager	1
	Police Clerk	14
	Clerk Typist	12
	Accounting Clerk	1
	Computer Technician/Programmer	1
	Switchboard Operator	1
	Radio Dispatcher	8
		38
Total Police and Civilian		46

(b) Staffing and Personnel Development Division:

This is a staff services division tasked with addressing and responding to the multi-dimensional human resource problems in the police department. In a formal sense, it would require the directional control of an Inspector, whose mandate would focus on creating a functionally-active, creative and independent personnel service sensitive to the occupational problems associated with law enforcement, plus the professional and developmental expectations of police personnel. He and his staff would work in concert with the Justice Institute of B. C. The schedule of personnel services administered by this Division would be: staff development, counselling services, personnel evaluation programs, personnel allocation, recruitment, job applicant investigations, chaplain services.

Staff requirements for this Division would be as follows:

Police:	Inspector	1
	Staff Sergeant	1
	Corporal	2
		4

Civilian:	Clerk Stenographer	1
	Clerk Typist	2
		3
Total Police and Civilian		7

(c) Community Services Division:

Traditionally, the police have attacked crime by reducing the opportunity (by patrol) and by attempting to reduce the desire (by the apprehension/punishment/deterrence model). While it is recognized that the punishment/deterrence model can reduce the desire to commit crime, it is also known that the desire can be related to attitude, self-concept, self-esteem, and organic disorders. These are a function of many inter-related factors, such as home environment, school environment, personal impairment (psychological and physiological), and employment opportunities.

Because of our credibility and clear mandate, we, the police, must, having assumed the responsibility, continue to develop innovative crime prevention strategies. The strategies, however, cannot amount simply to increasing resources to do more of the same. It must continue to incorporate new thinking and realignment of resources where necessary. As crime is not a police problem in the true sense, but, rather, a community problem, and as the police cannot solve the problem in isolation, the strategy(ies) must clearly include a wide variety of other agencies, both community and government, and also provide for citizen participation and, where necessary, professional

services. The strategy must involve the home, the school and the community, and must cope with psychological and physiological impairments.

The objective, therefore, of this Division, under the direction of an Inspector, would be to develop broader police/community-based strategies to reduce crime through early identification and intervention, and to ensure that all segments of the community share in their development. The staff requirements of the Division would be as follows:

Police:	Inspector	1
	Staff Sergeant	1
	Constable	12
		14
Civilian:	Clerk Stenographer	1
	Clerk Typist	2
		3
Total Police and Civilian		17

In summary, the total staff required to provide policing services to the Greater Victoria area, using the suggested model, is as follows:

	Current	Proposed	% Increase
Police	283	288	1.77
Civilian	61	93	52.46

The increase in police personnel is marginal. The numbers identified exemplify a "full service" police department, providing a broad range of operational and administrative services, 24 hours per day, and geared to the diverse needs and expectations of the community. Specifically, the relative personnel advantage could be translated into

greater on-street presence. Although existing civilian staff would be re-trained to assimilate new systems and procedures, the number of additional support staff would increase proportionately to the general and technical expansion in such services as research and financial planning, computer systems, communications-computer assisted dispatch, central purchasing, court, secretarial and fleet services.

However, it bears noting that the increase in civilian support staff is also influenced by the number of police service facilities to be manned and the hours of operation. As discussed later in this report, under Police Building, the preferred model calls for one central headquarters building. Were this to be realized, the number of civilian support staff could be substantially reduced.

RANK	CURRENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS					STRENGTH OF REGIONAL FORCE	BASIC SALARY COSTS		
	Victoria	Saanich	Oak Bay	Central Saanich	Total		Individual Salary Rates	Municipal Forces' Total Salaries	Regional Force's Total Salaries
Chief	1	1	1	1	4	1	65,088	260,352	65,088
Deputy Chief	0	1	1	0	2	2	60,204	120,408	120,408
Superintendent	2	0	0	0	2	1	56,952	113,904	56,952
Inspector	5	3	0	0	8	7	52,068	416,544	364,476
Staff Sergeant	7	7	1	0	15	16	43,932	658,980	702,912
Sergeant	25	22	5	1	53	43	40,836	2,164,308	1,755,948
Corporal	0	2	0	0	2	15	37,416	74,832	561,240
Constable	103	68	15	11	197	203	32,058	6,315,426	6,507,774
TOTAL POLICE	143	104	23	13	283	288	N/A	10,124,754	10,134,798
Civilian	23	30	3	5	61	93	21,457	1,308,877	1,995,501
TOTAL POLICE & CIVILIAN	166	134	26	18	344	381	N/A	11,433,631	12,130,299

NOTE: (1) Fringe benefits are variable but may be equated, generously, at approximately 20% of basic salaries.

(2) The Constable's salary is based on that of First Class Constable.

(3) Civilian salaries have been averaged, based on current salary levels in the Saanich Police Department.

PART IV

COST IMPLICATIONS

While it is recognized that careful planning and resource allocation are important elements of good management, and that precise estimates of costs are necessary for careful planning, the following cost information does not, due to time constraints, identify all the precise, fine-line cost centers characteristic of the four police budgets. The information does, however, provide some preliminary insight into those costs which are readily identifiable and which would have the most immediate impact on the delivery of policing services under the proposed model. They are: employee salaries, motor equipment operation (gas and fuel, equipment, parts and supplies), and police building.

1. Employee Salaries

The following table shows the per capita police expenditures for the year 1984 in the four police departments:

Municipality	Police Budget	Population	Per Capita Expenditure
Victoria	$7,733,080	64,379	$120.11
Saanich	6,269,711	78,710	79.65
Oak Bay	1,228,896	16,990	72.33
Central Saanich	870,105	9,890	87.97
Totals	$16,101,792	169,969	$ 94.73

The following table compares the relative basic salary costs (and departmental strengths), currently and for the proposed model:

2. Motor Equipment Operation

The quality of police service and the success of many police operations are dependent on the suitability of equipment. The automobile is the most effective and economical type of patrol, when operated conspicuously by one man using superior patrol methods.

The number of automobiles necessary to meet the requirements of service will be determined by three factors: (1) the number required during the hours of maximum need for patrol, which is in late afternoon and evening; (2) flexibility of assignment; and (3) the requirement for spares, as influenced by the promptness of repair and maintenance service. Without elaborating on these determinants, we will, for the purposes of this study, apply the commonly-used ratio of one vehicle to every four policemen.

The following table illustrates the number of police vehicles currently in service, and the cost of their operation:

Municipality	Cars	M/C	Miles Travelled	Miles Per Unit (Av.)	Total Cost	Cost Per Unit (Av.)
Victoria	30	7	21,840 385,680 407,520	3,120 12,856	$174,944.00	$4,728.00
Saanich	36	0	544,704	15,130	$196,893.41	$5,469.26
Oak Bay	6	0	60,000	10,000	$25,988.20	$4,331.36
Central Saanich	4	0	107,704	26,926	$36,612.72	$9,153.18
Totals	76	7	1,119,928	13,493	$434,438.33	$5,234.19

When we apply the four to one ratio to the recommended staffing levels for the consolidated model, we determine a basic requirement of 71 vehicles. Having regard for down time, due to mechanical failure, in

both cars and motorcycles, plus a limited use factor for motorcycles during inclement weather, the current numbers would prove quite satisfactory under the suggested model. A central service facility, suitably equipped and staffed, and providing such services as preventive maintenance and refurbishment, alternate fuel studies and experimentation, would yield longer service and substantially reduce fleet operating costs over the long run.

3. Police Building

The satisfactory performance of the varied duties included in a well rounded police program is dependent on suitable buildings and equipment. Their adequacy and condition decisively influence the quality and efficiency of service, as well as the morale of the force. Good police buildings and equipment create a favorable public impression, raise the prestige of the department, and aid substantially in creating satisfactory public relations.

In order to expedite operations and make the most productive use of personnel, consideration must be given to the manner of handling inquiries, complaints, communications, records, prisoners and property. Facilities should be arranged so that, in some Divisions, many tasks may be performed by one person, in one location, while in other Divisions, inter-related tasks may be effectively performed by many persons in different locations. Offices should be accessible to the public and to police officers in proportion to the use they make of them.

Convenience in operations, with attendant saving in police and civilian manpower, as well as public convenience, dictates that all

police services in the Greater Victoria area should be housed in one headquarters building. Field offices, with intercommunication arrangements, are also necessary to accommodate the delivery of services, while ensuring public convenience. Ideally, a centrally-located headquarters building, having a number of inter-communicating field or drop-in offices strategically located, is the preferred arrangement.

Accepting the enormous cost implications associated with acquiring a facility designed to meet the future needs resulting from probable population growths and developments in police practices, we have, despite the logistical problems involved, opted to recommend using the two main police buildings in Victoria and Saanich. Victoria, because of its cellblock facilities, would be designated the Operations Building, District 2--South. Saanich, although having operational field staff working out of it, would house all the support services and be designated District 1--North. Small inter-communicating field or drop-in offices would be maintained in Oak Bay and Central Saanich. Conceptually, these field offices would provide service to the public weekdays, Monday through Friday, from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.

The following table illustrates the cost of maintaining the four existing police buildings in 1984:

Victoria	$192,000.00
Saanich	$132,039.00
Oak Bay	$ 16,758.23
Central Saanich	$ 35,677.05
Total	$376,474.28

PART V

CONCLUSION

The requirements for policing a contemporary Victoria under the proposed model imply significant change and challenge for the Victoria area police. Several of these bear highlighting:

(1) The retention of current strengths of the police service, response and law enforcement oriented command-based system;

(2) A better balance among the six major police functions--response, referral, prevention, public education, crime solving and law enforcement--with significant new attention being paid to the referral, prevention and public education functions;

(3) Significant new initiatives in decentralized programming, particularly at the Division and community level;

(4) Additional resource allocation (e.g., the "Special Services" platoon) to centralized, specialized personnel to combat specific problems;

(5) New decentralized crime prevention programming at the community level;

(6) Introduction of more corporate-type administrative systems and practices to yield significant productivity gains;

(7) Renewed attention to full utilization of the Constable

generalist;

(8) New initiatives to create a dialogue between the Police and the public served by the police;

(9) The introduction of major new computer-based information and communication systems;

(10) Introduction of new and more sophisticated management technologies, including new planning and personnel systems, that would strengthen and improve the human resources management capability within the service, particularly in the areas of man-management, management and supervisory training, and succession and career planning.

We should not harbor the illusion that the provision of policing services in the Greater Victoria area, in either their present form or under consolidation, will necessarily cost less, any more than we can look upon economic instability as a thing of the past. The consolidation of police services under one command and overhead structure, as depicted in the suggested model, would require the services of only five additional sworn staff, or a 1.7% increase. Conversely, the number of civilian support staff would increase by 32, or 52%. The notable increase in civilian staff would impose a quantum change in those budgetary cost centers associated with salaries and benefits--hardly an acceptable approach to introducing and achieving fiscal policy goals.

But the job of policing must go on. The question is, "in what form and at what price?" Do we perpetuate duplication and decentralization of services? Unnecessary duplication is expensive in any form. Cumulatively, the existence of four separate police services, their

historical identities notwithstanding, the separate facilities housing them, and their respective staffing levels are expensive. Clearly, if police services were to be housed in one headquarters building, under one command, and supported by small intercommunicating field offices, the number of civilian support staff could be substantially reduced.

The major conclusion which can be derived from the limited analysis presented is that the size and multiplicity of jurisdictions, and the ever-present fragmentation and duplication of services inherent in such a model, auger well for consolidation or, at the very least, regionalization of certain specialized support services. Bigger is not always better; nor is smaller better. The latter has been tried and found wanting.

APPENDIX F

POLICE-FIRE CONSOLIDATION IN KALAMAZOO, MICHIGAN

CITY OF KALAMAZOO, MICHIGAN

December 30, 1986

Human Resources
Attn: David R. Wilson
City of Regina
P.O. Box 1790
Regina, Sask.
Canada S4P3C8

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Enclosed please find a copy of our Public Safety Concept paper which will tell you why, when and what we did to implement the PSO program. The results are summarized easily by stating the following:

1. Crosstraining was completed in four years, one year ahead of an accelerated schedule.

2. We have 21-26 patrol/sergeant units on the street 24 hours per day instead of 8-11 units.

3. We've opened one new public safety station in a previously poorly served geographic area for fire response due to long run distances.

4. We've reduced our staff from 383 people to 296 in four years.

5. Our PSOs are better paid but are comparable with other area police departments.

6. Our fire loss is down two years in a row.

7. Our criminal arrests are up 38%.

8. Response times are optimum.

9. Citizens have largely accepted the concept.

10. Our budget is about $2.8 million less than projected 1986 traditional fire and police departments.

Needless to say, we are pleased with the results, particularly as our funding resources continue to shrink. Minimizing resistance to change is a substantial task. Suggestions on how to do so might include the following:

1. Involve rank and file personnel in the early planning stages. i.e., PSO Study Committee.

2. Investigate and answer all concerns even though the answer may not be the one employees want to hear: convince them with facts.

3. Negotiate operational considerations so the employees know how they fit into the new program and "what's in it for them".

4. Make it a "Win-Win" situation for the City and the employees. Such things as voluntary crosstraining, pay incentives to do so, equal opportunity to get into the program, etc.

5. Conduct public forums for your citizens. Few will attend but obtain good media coverage. Use a panel of experts to discuss the pros and cons (i.e., Public Safety experts and traditional fire "experts"). Little resistance is generally received from the police side. Disect all fire concerns and answer them. Usually their examples will vaporize with logical discussion and exploration.

6. Keep in mind at all times you're not implementing change, you're violating a tradition.

7. Use experts to consult before and during implementation. Be sure they are experts, i.e., have they worked in a PSO department, have they <u>implemented</u> a PSO program or have they simply studied and/or written about the concept A few hundred spent may save thousands later by learning from their mistakes.

8. Develop a strong political base by your elected officials once the decision is made to implement. Perseverance is the key.

9. Select talented leadership with thick skin to implement the new organization.

10. Accept the premise that the police and fire service exist to support the City; the City doesn't exist for the police and fire service.

I hope this information will prove useful to you. If I can be of further assistance, please contact me.

Respectfully,

John E. Ross,
Chief of Public Safety

JER/sj

enc

APPENDIX G

REPORT OF THE POLICE OFFICERS WORKING GROUP ON REGIONALIZATION OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following is a summary of a series of discussions that were held on the topic of regional policing. The discussion group consisted of operational police personnel, police planners and police union representatives. The conclusions reached in these deliberations neither endorse nor reject the concept of regional policing; albeit, members of this committee were concerned that a decision on regional policing would be more dependant upon the political acceptability of the concept than upon a rational evaluation of the pros and cons. The committee believes that an in-depth study of the concept and all related issues should antecede any decision on consolidation of police departments in the GVRD or VCR.

The discussions of this committee were premised upon the hypothetical scenario that police services were to be consolidated. The committee was assigned the task of debating the issues that would emerge in such a situation. Many of these issues transcend cursory study or debate. In fact, the most significant achievement in these discussions was that they underscore the complexities involved in evaluating concepts such as regional policing. However, even though a number of issues could not be resolved due to the complex nature of the issues involved, a series of recommendation were formulated in relation to the assigned theme. These recommendations are summarized below:

RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY

1. ***Individual communities should continue to have significant input and control over the policing of their community.***

2. *Patrol, traffic and community relation services which interact directly with the public should be delivered by a decentralized structure which recognizes political boundaries.*

3. *Managers of these decentralized units should, within the confines of general service policy, have autonomy to deploy their resources in accordance with local needs.*

4. *An objective minimum standard of policing should be established. Local government should have authority to determine if they wish to incur the additional costs of an enhanced level of service. Local government should be required to maintain the required minimum level of service.*

5. *Any study conducted on regional policing should include an evaluation of alternative methods of organizing and classifying positions.*

6. *The committee recommended that members transferring to a new regional force should carry their seniority with them in the initial switch-over. Applicants that apply after the initial switch-over should accumulate seniority from the date of engagement in the new organization.*

7. *The committee holds the position that police officers currently serving in any of the municipalities involved should have "grandfather rights" to their current position.*

8. *All members transferring to a new regional force should be exempted from any qualification process.*

9. *The committee holds the position that any merger should guarantee that currently serving members will retain all their existing benefits unless a newly negotiated benefit exceeds their current benefit and the member agrees to relinquish that specific benefit.*

10. *The committee holds the position that wages would have to be raised to the level of the highest paid department in the regional area.*

11. *Police Union representatives should be consulted on the drafting of any legislation directed at police collective bargaining rights.*

12. *The committee holds the position that working conditions should be determined on a local basis in accordance with local policing needs and agreement of personnel.*

INTRODUCTION

During the fall of 1989 officials in the Ministry of the Solicitor General took the initiative to review the structure of policing within the Province of British Columbia. Their objective in conducting this review was to develop a reference point for policing in the year 2001. The Ministry assigned several consultants the task of formulating a policy position which will be used to direct the course of policing within British Columbia. In addition, a committee of police officers was convened to discuss the issues associated with regional policing. The contents of this report are a summary of these deliberations.

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE AND MANDATE

Under the auspices of Mr. Bruce Fuller, of Pacific Partners, a committee of police personnel was convened. This committee consisted of operational police personnel, police planners and police union representatives.[1] The committee met on eight occasions for three hour sessions to discuss the consolidation of police services.[2] These meetings were held at the following locations:

Office of the Solicitor General, 815 Hornby St., Vancouver, B.C.
Vancouver Police Department, 312 Main St., Vancouver, B.C.
Matsqui Police Department, 2838 Park St., Clearbrook, B.C.
Office of Pacific Partners, 700-845 Cambie St., Vancouver, B.C.
RCMP "E" Division H.Q., 5255 Heather St., Vancouver, B.C.
New Westminster Police Department, 511 Royal Ave., New Westminster, B.C.
B.C. Federation Of Police Officers, 601-190 Alexander St., Vancouver, B.C.
Delta Police Department, Ladner, B.C.

---

[1] Members of this committee are listed in Appendix "A".

[2] Guest speakers are also listed in Appendix "A".

Deliberations focused upon a hypothetical scenario that policing was to be consolidated within the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) and the Victoria Capital Region (VCR). During the initial meeting it was decided that the committee should identify and debate the issues, impact and concerns that would emerge from such a proposition. Therefore, the discussions focused upon three fundamental areas of concern to police officers.

- ***First, debate focused upon the issues, concerns and impact that regional policing would have upon service to the public.***
- ***Secondly, the committee debated the issues, concerns and impact that regional policing would have upon internal policy and police professionalism.***
- ***Finally, the committee examined the impact that regionalization could have upon the careers of currently serving police officers.***

A SYNOPSIS OF THE COMMITTEE'S POSITION

While no consensus of opinion prevailed regarding the impact that consolidation of police services might have upon policing in the region; the committee was unanimous in the belief that the issues involved are extremely complex. Furthermore, the committee believes that a decision to consolidate police services will likely be more dependant upon political acceptability of the initiative than upon any rational study of the issues involved. As such, the committee raised a number of issues and concerns regarding the possible consolidation of the various police departments in the GVRD and VCR. The committee held the view that formation of a study group, comprised of appropriate experts and adequate representation from the police community including representatives of unions and associations as well as

the B.C. Federation of Police Officers, should antecede any initiative to consolidate police services. This group should conduct a detailed study to evaluate the issues, concerns and impact that consolidation will have upon policing. The issues involved transcend a brief study commissioned by Police Services Branch, Ministry of Solicitor General. This same group could function as a transition planning group if a decision were made to proceed with some form of consolidated police service.

SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC

A) Organizational Structure

Discussions on this topic were characteristic of two antithetical views on police consolidation that permeate the law enforcement and academic communities in Canada and the United States. The first view emerged from the progressive movement in the United States. From the 1920's through to the 1960's most analysis directed at municipal problems recommended the creation of a single metropolitan wide government to take the place of many existing cities or special districts. The basic assumptions upon which these recommendations were based are that:

- ***Metropolitan areas are really single communities linked by social economic ties but artificially divided by government.***
- ***The needs of the metropolitan area cannot be met by fragmented government jurisdictions.***
- ***The elimination of duplication and overlap among governmental units will permit more efficient provision of public goods and services by larger units with greater economies of scale.[3]***

---

[3] See Robert L. Bish, Hugh O. Nourse, Urban Economics and Policy Analysis. Pages 200-201.

The influence of this reform movement carried over into commissions studying law enforcement in the United States. Reports by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement produced similar prescriptions to solve the problems of local policing in the United States.[4] The basic assumptions emerging from this reform movement were a fundamental catalyst in the move to regionalize policing in Ontario.

A second view of police consolidation to surface in these discussions was one primarily advocated by "Public Choice" economists. This view, which is based upon a large number of empirical studies, argues that consolidation of police departments leads to higher costs and lower public satisfaction with the service rendered.[5] Public Choice economists suggest a tiered approach is a more appropriate structure for delivery of labour intensive services such as policing. In this situation, large capital items such as communications systems or computerized records systems are regionalized; however, police services that interact with the public should remain as a local entity.

B) Level of Service

The level of police service varies from municipality to municipality. This situation exists for a variety of reasons such as financial constraints, established patterns of enforcement and the demographic make-up of the community. In implementing a regional policing structure a number of issues would arise in relation to the level of service. The

---

[4] See Robert L. Bish, Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government, Metropolitan Reform Reconsidered. Pages 41-42.

[5] See Eleanor Ostrom, Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions, Social Science Quarterly Vol 53., December 1972. Pages 474-493.

following list provides a few examples of the issues and concerns discussed by this committee:

- **Would a regional police force impose a uniform level of service on all municipalities? If so, who will pay for the increased cost of this enhanced service?**
- **Who will decide what the level of service should be and how will it be measured?**

C) Accountability

Currently, local governments have financial control over the operation of their police force. Resource increases must be approved by them. While the concept of police independence prevents local government from intervention in police investigations, they do have the right to direct police action toward specific community problems. Therefore, there is a two-dimensional issue of accountability that arises. First, the police must be responsive to the needs of the community and use their resources in the most efficient manner possible. At the same time local government has an obligation to ensure that a police department has adequate resources to meet the demands the community places upon them. The following items outline some of the accountability issues that were raised by the committee:

- **How would a regional force ensure that resources are not drawn to the regional core leaving outlying areas with inadequate resources?**
- **How would a regional force ensure that policing priorities in the regional core do not override the priorities of smaller municipalities?**
- **Would the accountability structure be centralized or would it recognize a need for accountability to local government?**
- **Can you expect to achieve local police accountability without some degree of local financial control?**

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The discussions produced more questions than answers. Similarly, the time available was not conducive to a comprehensive analysis of the topic. In addition, as noted earlier, there was some variance of opinion over the type of structure that will facilitate the most effective policing for the communities involved. However, the group did achieve general consensus on the following points:

1. ***Individual communities should continue to have significant input and control over the policing of their community.***

2. ***Patrol, traffic and community relation services which interact directly with the public should be delivered by a decentralized structure which recognizes political boundaries.***

3. ***Managers of these decentralized units should, within the confines of general service policy, have autonomy to deploy their resources in accordance with local needs.***

4. ***An objective minimum standard of policing should be established. Local government should have authority to determine if they wish to incur the additional costs of an enhanced level of service. Local government should be required to maintain the required minimum level of service.***

INTERNAL POLICY AND POLICE PROFESSIONALISM

Once again, discussions dealing with this topic were based upon the hypothetical scenario that a decision had been made to consolidate the police departments in the GVRD and VCR. As such, the committee focused upon a number of internal policy issues that impact police professionalism. The topics considered are outlined below.

A) Para-military Structure

There was general consensus that the current method of structuring police organizations and the associated classification system constrains the development of police professionalism. The current rank structure has evolved to the point where it defines the level of complexity that an individual is allowed to encounter in their function. The original reason for creation of a hierarchy was to accommodate vertical integration within the organization. The current rank structure and classification system generally ignores that specific purpose. The committee believes that this structure may have passed its usefulness and a new organization should consider some alternatives. It may be that a more effective structure would pay individuals on the basis of experience and only create supervisory positions where the specific position legitimately functions as a vertical integrator.

RECOMMENDATION

5. ***Any study conducted on regional policing should include an evaluation of alternative methods of organizing and classifying positions.***

B) Seniority

Creation of a new regional police force would require some policy on the seniority of members.

RECOMMENDATION

6. ***The committee recommended that members transferring to a new regional force should carry their seniority with them in the initial switch-over. Applicants that apply after the initial switch-over should accumulate seniority from the date of engagement in the new organization.***

C) Transfers

Members of the committee expressed the view that police officers currently serving one of the municipalities involved should have "grandfather rights" to their current position. Furthermore, they should retain their position into the future unless they are offered a promotion or request a change. Other individuals engaging with the organization should be subject to postings in accordance with management requirements. However, if individuals are transferred it may be necessary to reimburse them for moving expenses if commuting distance is excessive.

RECOMMENDATION

7. **The committee holds the position that police officers currently serving in any of the municipalities involved should have "grandfather rights" to their current position.**

D) Training

The issue was raised regarding the qualification of individuals transferring to a new regional force. Would the standards established by the Justice Institute be the criteria applied in determining any offer of engagement or requirement for qualification? There was a consensus that personnel, serving in any department that is being considered as a candidate for consolidation, should be deemed equally qualified. Any personnel engaging after an initial switch-over should be required to pass a qualification process.

RECOMMENDATION

8. **All members transferring to a new regional force should be exempted from any qualification process.**

E) Promotions

The system of qualifying for promotion is different within each of the police departments participating in these discussions. A new organization would have to establish a uniform policy for promotion. Although most committee members had some concerns about their current system, there was no consensus regarding what would constitute an ideal system. Most members agreed that individuals wishing to be considered for promotion should pass through a qualification process.

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND WORKING CONDITIONS

A) Benefits

Currently, each police department operates under a different collective agreement. If these departments were consolidated it would seem logical that their bargaining units would also have to be consolidated and a single collective agreement negotiated. A number of issues would emerge in the process of harmonizing these agreements. For example, how do you rectify the variance in benefits that currently exist throughout the region? If each area were to bargain independently it would be difficult to staff positions or transfer personnel to areas with inferior benefits. If a single bargaining unit were established, which benefit package would be accepted for the new organization?

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. **The committee holds the position that any merger should guarantee that currently serving members will retain all their existing benefits unless a newly negotiated benefit exceeds their current benefit and the member agrees to relinquish that specific benefit.**

10. **The committee holds the position that wages would have to be raised to the level of the highest paid department in the regional area.**

11. **Police Union representatives should be consulted on the drafting of any legislation directed at police collective bargaining rights.**

Implementation of these recommendations will not be achieved without difficulty. For example, some form of agreement would have to be negotiated with the federal government in regards to RCMP pensions and other benefits if a new organization wished to secure the engagement of RCMP personnel.

B) Working Conditions

Another area of concern to members of the committee was the issue of working conditions. Members questioned whether or not a single shift schedule and standard working conditions would be imposed under a consolidated police department.

RECOMMENDATION

12. **The committee holds the position that working conditions should be determined on a local basis in accordance with local policing needs and agreement of personnel.**

CONCLUSION

The committee believes that the issues involved in the evaluation of regional policing are extremely complex and transcend a brief study. A survey of the literature demonstrates there are conflicting opinions regarding the optimum degree of consolidation. Members of this committee believe that the optimum degree of consolidation is highly dependant upon

the circumstances within the region. A number of the consolidation initiatives in Ontario were attempts to deal with problems created by the existence of a large number of small inadequate police departments within a specific region. A much different environment exists within the GVRD and VCR. It is quite feasible that an optimum solutions to problems in the GVRD and VCR will be substantially different than an optimum solution to problems in rural Ontario. Therefore, the members of this committee believe that ***an in-depth study*** *of all concepts, research and issues associated with regional policing* ***should antecede any decision*** *on the consolidation of police departments within the GVRD and VCR.*

COMMITTEE PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Bruce B. FULLER
Managing Partner
Pacific Partners
700-845 Cambie Street
Vancouver, B.C.

Kevin BEGG
Sergeant
Management Services
"E" Div. H.Q.,RCMP
Vancouver, B.C.

Barry C. SULINA
Sergeant
Operations Supervisor
New Westminster Police Dept
New Westminster, B.C.

Pat H. FITZGERALD
Constable
Port Moody Police Dept
Port Moody, B.C.
Port Moody, B.C.

Gordon KILOH
Sergeant
West Vancouver Police Dept
West Vancouver, B.C.

Gary GREER
Sergeant
Planning and Research
Vancouver Police Dept
Vancouver, B.C.

Axel HOVBRENDER
Constable
Planning and Research
Vancouver Police Dept
Vancouver, B.C.

Al HAMMERSMARK
Sergeant
Delta Police Dept
Delta, B.C.

Ron GAUDET
President
B.C. Federation of
Police Officers
Victoria, B.C.

Doug W. STUCKEL
Detective Sergeant
Matsqui Police Service
Clearbrook, B.C.

GUEST SPEAKERS

Gerald WOODS
Director,
Research and Demonstration
Police and Law Enforcement
Directorate
Police and Security Branch
Ottawa, Ontario

Tom RIPPON
Ministry of Solicitor General
Police Services Branch
910 Government Street
Victoria, B.C.

Diane Bell
Labour Relations Manager
Coordinated Police Bargaining Council
B.C. Federation of Police Officers
601-190 Alexander St., Vancouver, B.C.

ENDNOTES

1. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Adminstration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p.91; F.B.I. Uniform Crime Report Centre, December, 1989.

2.Richard A. Loreto, "Reorganization of Municipal Police Forces in Ontario: The Convergence of Functional and Local Reform Interests." unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Toronto, 1984; S.C. Fairweather, A Review of Regionalized Policing in Ontario, (Ontario Police Commission, 1978).

3.The Police Enquiry Committee, The Organization of the Police Force in the City of Winnipeg (Winnipeg: The Committee, 1973); Quebec Police Commission, Regional Policing in Quebec, n.d.

4.Cited by Loreto, op. cit.

5.Nova Scotia Police Commission, A Study of the Feasibility of Establishing a Regional Police Force in the County of Cape Breton (Halifax: The Commission, 1982); Richard Apostle and Philip Stenning, Public Policing in Nova Scotia, (Halifax: The Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, 1988).

6.Alan Grant, Policing Arrangements in New Brunswick with Particular Reference to the Highway Patrol Function: A Report Prepared for the Department of the Solicitor General of New Brunswick, July 1988, (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1988).

7.Elinor Ostrom and Dennis C. Smith, On the Fate of 'Lilliputs' in Metropolitan Policing," Public Administration Review (March/April 1976), pp 192-200.

8.Communication from Mr. R.F. Lunney, Commissioner of Public Safety for the City of Winnipeg, January 5, 1990.

9.Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General, Policing Services Division, Ontario Police Forces Budget and Resource Analysis Summary, 1989.

10.Terry W. Koepsell and Charles M. Girard note that with regard to costs, evidence suggests that consolidation may realistically be expected to produce more law enforcement services for the dollar than is possible under independent small local agencies. It is common to find the cost of existing service under a local police department compared with the cost of a desired level of service under a consolidated system. In such cases, the costs of the consolidated system may be higher. This is because the "existing" service provided by local agencies generally reflects the under-manned and under-equipped conditions that precipitated consideration of a merger in the first place. To be more accurate, the cost of a desired level of service under an existing local agency should be estimated and compared with the cost of the same level of service under a consolidated system. Because of the limited use of this technique in the field, few accurate cost comparisons could be found. Small Police Agency Consolidation: Suggested Approaches (U.S. Department of Justice, 1979), p. vi.

11.British Columbia, Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, British Columbia Population Forecast, 1988-2011, p. 28.

12.British Columbia Police Commission, Report of the Task Force on Municipal Police Costs in B.C. (The Commission, 1978); British Columbia Police Commission, "Regionalization of the Capital Regional District," typescript, 1980; Ministry of Attorney General of B.C., Police

Services Branch, "Regionalization of Police Services in Jurisdictions Policed by the R.C.M.P.," typescript, 1983; CRD Area Chiefs, "Greater Victoria Regional Police Services," typescript, 1986; Bob Leighton and Associates, "Proposal/Discussion Paper on Regional Policing in the GVRD," typescript, July 1988.

13. See for example "No Mandate from Legislature or People," an editorial in The Daily Colonist, Saturday, August 12, 1950.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State-Local relations in The Criminal Justice System, Washington, DC, 1971.

Atchison, R.M., et al, Study of Police Management Information Systems, Volume IV, report prepared for the Ministry of Solicitor General of Canada, 1984-32.

Atchison , R.M, et al, Study of Police Management Information Systems, Volume V, report prepared for the Ministry of Solicitor General of Canada, 1984-33.

Australia, Police Regulations Act, 1958.

Australia, Police Regulations, 1979.

Australia, Victoria Police, Victoria, Annual Report, 1979.

Australia, Victoria Police, Victoria, Annual Report, 1980.

B.C. Tel Group, "A Proposal for a Communications Superhighway to Serve the Government of British Columbia," n.d.

Bender, Lewis G., "The Regionalization Alternative in Rural Areas", Policy Studies Review, Volume 2, Number 1, August 1982.

Besinger, G.J., "Metropolization-The Metropolitan Toronto Police", Police Law Quarterly, Volume 7, Number 4, 1978.

Betke, C.D. and G. Gordon Thompson, Selected Aspects On The Historical Role of the Mounted Police in Canada, Ottawa: RCMP Historical Section, 1977.

Bowden, Jim, Victoria Clark, and Anne Curie, An Examination of Policing in B.C., unpublished research paper, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, 1988.

British Columbia Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the Dominion of Canada and the Government of the Province of British Columbia, dated 9 August 1950.

British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General correspondence of the Honorable Gordon Wismer, Attorney General of British Columbia (1936-1950).

British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General, Police Services Branch, "Regionalization of Police Services in Jurisdictions Policed by the R.C.M.P.," Typescript, 1983.

British Columbia Police Commission, Provincial Standards for Municipal Police Departments in British Columbia, January 1990.

British Columbia Police Commission, Report of the Task Force on Municipal Police Costs in B.C. (The Commission, 1978).

British Columbia Police Commission, "Regionalization of the Capital Regional District," Typescript, 1980.

British Columbia Police Regulations, 1904.

British Columbia Provincial Police, The Shoulder Strap, Editions 5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16-22. (1940-1950).

British Columbia Police Act, 1988.

British Columbia Provincial Police, Police Regulations and Constables' Handbook, 1924.

British Columbia Statutes, Police and Prisons Regulation Act (1948).

Brown, P. Hereward, 92 Years of Pride (1858-1950) The Story of the British Columbia Provincial Police, B.C.P.P. Veteran's Association, 1986.

Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics Law Enforcement Program, R.C.M.P. and non-R.C.M.P Municipal Policing Expenditures 1988/89, (Ottawa, 1989).

Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Selected Police Administration Characteristics of Municipal Departments, 1988 (Ottawa 1989).

Clark, Ramsey, Crime In America, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1970.

Committee for Economic Development, Reducing Crime and Assuring Justice, June 1972.

Committee Report, Study on Withdrawal of O.P.P. Services to Regional Municipalities, February, 1977.

Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of State Police, Annual Report, 1980.

CRD Area Chiefs, "Greater Victoria Regional Police Services," typescript, 1986.

de Verteuil, Jacques, Metropolitan Toronto Community Policing Survey, working paper #2, prepared for Programs Branch, Solicitor General of Canada, Ministry Secretariat, 1987-19.

Fairweather, S.C., A Review of Regionalized Policing in Ontario, Report to the Ontario Police Commission, May, 1978.

Fairweather, S.C., A Study of the Waterloo Regional Police Force, Report to the Ontario Police Commission, December 1976.

Fairweather, S.C., and J.S. McLaren, A Study of the City of Thunder Bay Police Force, Report to the Board of Commissioners of Police, Municipality of Thunder Bay, January 1978.

Fyfe, James J., Ed., Police Practice In the "90's", Practical Management Series, ICMA, 1989.

German, Peter M., "Federal Provincial Contracting For Royal Canadian Mounted Police Services: A Survey Utilizing the Interplay Model of Public Policy Analysis", Unpublished Master Thesis, Simon Fraser University, March 1990.

Grant, Alan, Policing Arrangements in New Brunswick with Particular Reference to the Highway Patrol Function, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, July 15, 1988.

Greater Vancouver Regional District, Enhanced 9-1-1 Emergency Telephone Project Report, January 10, 1990.

Hale Edward B., et al, Task Force on Policing in Ontario, Solicitor General, February 1974.

Hall, J.R., Acting Chief Commissioner, "Enquiry Regarding Structure of the Victoria Police Force", Australia, memorandum dated January 27, 1982.

Harvison, C.V., The Horsemen, McLelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1967.

Holt, Simma, Terror In the Name Of God, McLelland and Stewart, Toronto 1964.

International City Management Association, Management Information Service Report, Vol. 14, No. 11, November 1982.

Johnson, Marilyn, Regionalization of the Capital Regional District, report to the B.C. Police Commission, April, 1980.

Kalamazoo, Michigan, - "Consolidation of Fire and Police Services", A Report on Public Safety for The City of Kalamazoo Michigan, Prepared by the Public Safety Committee, July 1981.

Kapsch, S., Minnesota Police Organization and Community Resource Allocation, St. Paul: Minnesota State Planning Agency, 1970.

Koepsell, Terry W., and Charles M. Girard, Small Policing Agency Consolidation - Suggested Approaches Summary of Findings and Conclusions, Washington: United States Department of Justice, July 1979.

Lee, Jeff, Regionalization - Vancouver, Vancouver Sun, May 17, 1989.

Leighton, Bob and Associates, "Proposal/Discussion Paper on Regional Policing in the GVRD," typescript, July 1988.

Loree, Donald J., "Innovation and Change in a Regional Police Force", Canadian Police College Journal, Volume 12, Number 4, 1988.

Loree, Donald J. & C. Murphy, Community Policing In the 1980's: Recent Advances In Policing Programs, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987.

Loreto, Richard Anthony, Regionalizing Municipal Police Forces in Ontario: The Convergence of Functional and Local Reform Interests, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1984.

Loreto, Richard A., "Reorganization of Municipal Police Forces on Ontario: The Consequence of Functional Interests." Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Toronto, 1984; S.C. Fairweather, A Review of Regionalized Policing in Ontario, Ontario Police Commission, 1978.

Mayo, H.B., Police and Fire Services, Chapter 15, Report of the Ottawa-Carleton Review Commission, Province of Ontario, October 1976.

Murphy, Chris and Jacques de Verteuil, Metropolitan Toronto Community Policing Survey, working paper #1, Solicitor General of Canada, Users Report, 1987-19.

Neave, Edwin H., and B. Williams, "A Police Force Activities Model", Canadian Police College Journal, Volume 11, Number 2, 1987.

New South Wales Police Department, Annual Report, 1979.

"No Mandate From Legislature or People", The Daily Colonist, August 12, 1950.

New South Wales, Police Regulations Act, 1972.

New South Wales, Police Regulations, (Superannuation and Appeals) Amendment Act, 1979.

New South Wales, Police Regulations (Superannuation) Act.

Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Education, Public Services and Provincial-Municipal Relations, Volume II., Chapter 15, Police Protection. n.d.

Nova Scotia Police Commission, A Study of the Feasibility of Establishing a Regional Police Force in the County of Cape Breton (Halifax: The Commission, 1982); Richard Apostle and Philip Stenning, Public Policing in Nova Scotia, (Halifax: The Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, 1988).

Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General, Policing Services Division, Ontario Police Forces Budget and Resource Analysis Summary, 1989.

Ontario Provincial Police, Consolidation of Local Police Forces, Unpublished Report, 1987.

Ontario Task Force on Policing, Report to the Solicitor General of Ontario, February 1974.

Oosthoek, Arie, The Role of the Police in British Columbia, Research Paper, December 3, 1986.

Ostrom, E., "On Righteousness, Evidence, and Reform: The Police Story," Urban Affairs Quarterly, Volume 10. n.d.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks and G.P. Whitaker, Police Services Study -Directions For Phase 2, Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, 1976.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks and G.P. Whitaker, Policing - Is There A System? Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, 1977.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks and G.P. Whitaker, Some Evidence On The Effects of Police Agency Size, Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory And Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, 1977.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks, G.P. Whitaker and S.L. Percy, Evaluating Police Organization - Police Services Study Technical Report - Draft, Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, 1977.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks and G.P. Whitaker, Evaluating the Organization of Service Delivery - The Police - Police Services Study - Technical report, Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, 1976.

Ostrom, E., E.F. Scott, Portfolio of Research Instruments on Police Referral Final Report, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Bloomington, Indiana, n.d.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks and G.P. Whitaker, Policing Metropolitan America, National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., n.d.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks and G.P. Whitaker, Public Services Industry Approach to the Study of Police in Metropolitan Areas - Police Services Study Technical Report, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Washington D.C., 1976.

Ostrom, E., Police Department Policies Toward Education, Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, 1977.

Ostrom, E., Police Consolidation and Economies-of-Scale - Do They go Together?, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Washington, D.C., 1976.

Ostrom, E., Need For Multiple Indicators in Measuring the Output of Public Agencies, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Washington, D.C., n.d.

Ostrom, E., Historical Review of Entry-Level Training Legislation Police Services Study Technical Report, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Bloomington, Indiana, n.d.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks and G.P. Whitaker, Defining and Measuring Structural Variations in Interorganizational Arrangements, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Washington, D.C., 1974.

Ostrom, E., Design of Institutional Arrangements and the Responsiveness of the Police, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Bloomington, Indiana, 1975.

Ostrom, E., Topeka (KS) - Major Case Squad - Police Services Study Fact Sheet, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Washington, D.C., n.d.

Ostrom, E., Community Public Services and Responsiveness - on the Design of Institutional Arrangements for the Provision of Police Services, Bloomington, Indiana, 1974.

Ostrom, E., Institutional Arrangements and the Measurement of Policy Consequences - Applications of Evaluating Police Performance, Sage Publications, Inc., Newbury Park, California 91320, Urban Affairs Quarterly (June 1971), P.447-475, 1971.

Ostrom, E., D.C. Smith., Are the Lilliputs in Metropoitan Policing Failures?, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Bloomington, Indiana, 1975.

Ostrom, E., G.Whitaker, Does Local Community Control of Police Make a Difference - Some Preliminary Findings, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Washington, D.C., 1973.

Ostrom, E., G.P. Whitaker, Community Control and Governmental Responsiveness - The Case of Police in Black Neighbourhoods, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Washington, D.C.

Ostrom, E., W.H. Baugh, Community Organization and the Provision of Police Services, Sage Publications, Inc., 2111 West Hillcrest Drive, Newbury Park, California 91320, 1973.

Ostrom E., On the Meaning and Measurement of Output and Efficiency in the Provision of Urban Police Services, Pergamon Press, Inc., Elmsford, New York, 1973.

Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks, Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Police Forces A Reappraisal of Some Old Assertions, American Society for Public Administration, Washington, D.C., 1973.

Ostrom, E., D.C. Smith, "On the Fate of 'Lilliputs' in Metropolitan Policing," Public Administration Review (March/April 1976), pp. 192-200, n.d.

Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Prevention Oriented Policing Service-Research Report, 1971.

Ottawa-Carleton, Regional Municipality of, Implications of Regional Policing in Ottawa-Carleton, October 1974.

Ottawa-Carleton, Regional Review, Phase I Report, n.d.

Pachon, H.P., and N.P. Novich Jr., "Consolidation of Urban Police Services - A Focus on the Police" Public Administration Review, Volume 37, Number 1, 1977.

Parks, Roger B. Metropolitan Structure And Systematic Performance: The Case of Police Service Delivery, Indiana University, n.d.

Police (Charges, Expenses and Allowances) Regulations, 1977.

Police (Constitution Strength Organization and Seniority) Regulations, 1976.

Police Enquiry Committee, The Report to the Executive Policy Committee of the City of Winnipeg on, The Organization of the Police Force in the City of Winnipeg, 1973.

Police Enquiry Committee, The Organization of the Police Force in the City of Winnipeg (Winnipeg: The Committee, 1973). Quebec Police Commission, Regional Policing in Quebec, n.d. Police Services Division, Ministry of Solicitor General, Ontario Police Forces Budget and Resource Analysis Summary, Province of Ontario, 1988-1989.

Policing Services Division, Ontario Police Forces, Budget and Resource Analysis Summary (1988-1989).

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967) p.91; F.B.I. Uniform Crime Report Centre, December, 1989.

Rich, R., E. Ostrom, Development and Pretesting of a Street Lighting Simulator for Obtaining Information Concerning Citizens' Perceptions of and Preferences for Street Lighting, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Washington D.C., n.d.

Ross, Patricia D., et al, Task Force on Municipal Policing Costs in British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General, July 1978.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Regionalization Study of the Okanagan, August 19, 1985.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, A Preliminary Research Outline, Regionalization in the North Okanagan: Phase I Feasibility Study, n.d.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, A Preliminary Research Outline, Regionalization of Policing in British Columbia, n.d.

Skaburskis, Vischer, Spatial Implications of Provincial Grants and Subsidies to Local Areas, Report prepared for the Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, June 1980.

Smith, D.C., E. Ostrom, Effects of Training and Education on Police Attitudes and Performance (From Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice, 1974 by Herbert Jacob - see NCJ-9989), Sage Publications, Inc., Newbury Park, California, 1974.

Smith, D.C., E. Ostrom, Effects of Training and Education on Police Attitudes and Performance - A Preliminary Analysis, Indiana University Department of Political Science, Bloomington, Indiana, 1974.

"Switch to RCMP Tied To Security", Vancouver Sun, 28 March, 1950:2.

Talbot C.K., C.H.S. Jayewarden, and T.J. Juliani, Canada's Constables, The Historical Development Of Policing In Canada, Crimecare Publications, 1985.

Taylor, J.J., and F.E. Davis, A Study on the Feasibility of the Amalgamation of the Police Forces of: Township of Markham, Village of Markham, Township of Vaughan, Village of Stouffville, Village of Woodbridge, Town of Richmond Hill, In the County of York, 1968.

Tomovich, V.A., and D.J. Loree, "In Search of New Directions: Policing in Niagara Region," Canadian Police College Journal, Volume 13, Number 1, 1989.

Trojanowicz, Robert and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Community Policing, Anderson Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1990.

U.S. Department of Justice, Small Police Agency Consolidation: Suggested Approaches, 1979.

United States Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, August, 1989.

Walker, Christopher R., "The Community Police Station Developing a Model", Canadian Police College Journal, Volume II., No. 4, 1987.

Wesson, Gerald, "Capture of Legere," Newcastle, New Brunswick, Times-Colonist, November 23, 1989.

Whitaker, G.P., E. Ostrom and R.B. Parks, Using Citizen Surveys to Evaluate the Organization of Policing - Police Services -Study Fact Sheet, Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, 1977.

Wilson, David R., Crime Study, November 21, 1989.

Woodcock, George, and Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1968.